Jiang Bolong’s cash flow has repeatedly suffered from high inventory turnover and slow turnover. The controlling shareholder is a witness to the bribery case.

  Editor’s Note of China Economic NetShenzhen Jiangbolong Electronics Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jiangbolong") will hold its initial meeting on December 16, 2021. The company plans to list on the Growth Enterprise Market of Shenzhen Stock Exchange this time, and the number of public offerings will not be less than 10% of the total share capital of the company after the issuance, and it will not exceed 42 million shares. The sponsor and lead underwriter are CITIC Jiantou Securities Co., Ltd. and the joint lead underwriter is HSBC Qianhai Securities Co., Ltd. Jiang Bolong plans to raise 1.50 billion yuan this time, of which 700 million yuan will be used for the second phase construction project of Jiang Bolong Zhongshan Storage Industrial Park, 350 million yuan will be used for enterprise-level and industrial-level storage research and development projects, and 450 million yuan will be used to supplement working capital. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiangbolong’s operating income was 4.228 billion yuan, 5.721 billion yuan, 7.276 billion yuan and 5.302 billion yuan respectively, of which the main business income was 4.228 billion yuan, 5.721 billion yuan, 7.276 billion yuan and 5.301 billion yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong received cash of 4.135 billion yuan, 5.874 billion yuan, 7.539 billion yuan and 5.338 billion yuan, respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiangbolong’s net profit was-58,436,900 yuan, 127 million yuan, 276 million yuan and 680 million yuan respectively, of which the net profit attributable to the owners of the parent company was-56,539,700 yuan, 128 million yuan, 276 million yuan and 680 million yuan respectively. 

  From January to June of 2018 to 2021, the net cash flow generated by Jiangbolong’s operating activities was-212 million yuan,-173 million yuan, 424 million yuan and-971 million yuan respectively. 

  From January to September 2021, Jiangbolong’s operating income was 7.679 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 67.45%; The net profit was 948 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 3997.91%; The net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company was 948 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 3997.91%; The net profit of returning to the mother after deduction was 871 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 475.74%; The net cash flow from operating activities was-838 million yuan, compared with-2,645,900 yuan in the same period of last year, with a change ratio of-31,562.27%. 

  Jiang Bolong estimates that the operating income in 2021 will be 9.600 billion yuan to 10.140 billion yuan, an increase of 31.94% to 39.36% compared with 2020; The net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company is 960 million yuan to 1.035 billion yuan, an increase of 247.53% to 274.68% compared with 2020; After deducting non-recurring gains and losses, the net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company is 883 million yuan to 958 million yuan, an increase of 186.80% to 21.116% compared with 2020. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the total assets of Jiangbolong were 2.751 billion yuan, 4.033 billion yuan, 5.055 billion yuan and 5.673 billion yuan respectively; The total liabilities were 706 million yuan, 924 million yuan, 1.592 billion yuan and 1.603 billion yuan respectively. 

  After review, from January to September 2021, the total assets of Jiangbolong were 6.091 billion yuan, an increase of 20.50% over the end of last year; Total liabilities were 1.751 billion yuan, up 9.98% from the end of last year. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the current ratio of Jiangbolong was 3.60 times, 3.95 times, 2.76 times and 3.06 times respectively, the quick ratio was 1.54 times, 1.87 times, 1.32 times and 0.86 times respectively, and the asset-liability ratio (parent company) was 5.30%, 9.19% and 0.86 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the average asset-liability ratio of comparable listed companies in the same industry was 56.77%, 54.01%, 51.65% and 54.49% respectively. Among them, Smart Global’s asset-liability ratio is 72.19%, 61.16%, 64.14% and 76.66%, Weigang’s asset-liability ratio is 66.34%, 66.89%, 65.80% and 63.09%, and the pirate ship’s asset-liability ratio is 79.94%, 79.54% and 66. 

  From January to June of 2018 to 2021, Jiangbolong’s monetary funds were 531 million yuan, 1.198 billion yuan, 1.585 billion yuan and 603 million yuan respectively, accounting for 22.83%, 34.47%, 36.86% and 12.76% of current assets respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the deposits in Jiangbolong Bank were 531 million yuan, 1.198 billion yuan, 1.585 billion yuan and 603 million yuan respectively, accounting for 99.98%, 99.99%, 100.00% and 99.99% of the monetary funds respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the book value of Jiangbolong’s accounts receivable was 407 million yuan, 409 million yuan, 385 million yuan and 610 million yuan respectively, accounting for 17.50%, 11.77%, 8.96% and 12.93% of current assets respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the balance of accounts receivable of Jiangbolong was 408 million yuan, 410 million yuan, 386 million yuan and 611 million yuan respectively, of which the balance of accounts receivable within three months was 397 million yuan, 405 million yuan, 353 million yuan and 611 million yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the amounts paid back by Jiang Bolong after the accounts receivable period were 408 million yuan, 409 million yuan, 386 million yuan and 537 million yuan, respectively, and the proportions of the paid back after the period were 99.87%, 99.90%, 100.00% and 87.88%. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the turnover rate of accounts receivable of Jiangbolong was 13.83 times, 14.02 times, 18.33 times and 21.30 times respectively, and the average of comparable companies in the same industry was 7.79 times, 7.11 times, 7.39 times and 7.59 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the accounts receivable turnover of Smart Global, a comparable company in the same industry, was 6.13 times, 5.33 times, 5.18 times and 5.61 times respectively, the accounts receivable turnover of Weigang was 9.75 times, 8.91 times, 9.66 times and 8.53 times respectively, and the accounts receivable turnover of pirate ships was 7.68 times and 6.76 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the book value of Jiangbolong’s inventory was 1.333 billion yuan, 1.825 billion yuan, 2.246 billion yuan and 3.393 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 57.26%, 52.53%, 52.24% and 71.84% of current assets. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the inventory balance of Jiangbolong was 1.391 billion yuan, 1.852 billion yuan, 2.267 billion yuan and 3.457 billion yuan respectively, and the inventory depreciation reserve was 58.156 million yuan, 27.0826 million yuan, 21.3206 million yuan and 64.1743 million yuan respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that the company’s ending inventory is relatively large, and may further increase with the expansion of the company’s operating scale. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the inventory turnover rate of Jiangbolong was 3.04 times, 3.23 times, 3.15 times and 2.95 times respectively, and the average of comparable companies in the same industry was 5.21 times, 5.31 times, 5.25 times and 4.23 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the inventory turnover of Smart Global, a comparable company in the same industry, was 5.72 times, 5.73 times, 6.43 times and 4.97 times respectively, the inventory turnover of Weigang was 6.13 times, 5.71 times, 4.60 times and 3.50 times respectively, and the inventory turnover of pirate ships was 5.64 times, 5.82 times and 5.50 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong’s short-term loans were 271 million yuan, 350 million yuan, 414 million yuan and 574 million yuan respectively, accounting for 41.82%, 39.72%, 26.57% and 37.15% of current liabilities respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the comprehensive gross profit margin of Jiangbolong was 7.62%, 10.71%, 11.96% and 21.59% respectively, and the gross profit margin showed an overall upward trend. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the average gross profit margins of comparable companies in the same industry were 15.17%, 17.42%, 19.05% and 21.54% respectively. Among them, the gross profit margins of Smart Global are 22.62%, 19.60%, 19.28% and 18.44% respectively, while those of Weigang are 6.05%, 11.07%, 14.82% and 18.60% respectively, and those of pirate ships are 11.95%, 16.14% and 20.53 respectively. 

  According to Jiangbolong’s product categories, the gross profit margin of embedded storage is 6.41%, 14.21%, 10.84% and 24.63%, the gross profit margin of solid-state disk is 4.60%, 5.27%, 9.75% and 15.33%, and the gross profit margin of mobile storage is 10.16%, 10.34% and 18.33% respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the sales amount of Jiangbolong to the top five customers was 929 million yuan, 1.803 billion yuan, 2.510 billion yuan and 1.789 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 21.98%, 31.51%, 34.49% and 33.74% of the total sales respectively. 

  It is worth noting that in 2018, the largest customer of Jiangbolong was the listed company Weir, and the sales amount of Jiangbolong to Weir in that year was 315 million yuan. By 2019, Weir was ranked as the fourth largest customer of Jiangbolong, and the sales amount of Jiangbolong to Weir in that year was 236 million yuan. From January to June in 2020 and 2021, Weir withdrew from the list of the top five customers of Jiangbolong. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the purchase amount of Jiangbolong from the top five suppliers was 2.861 billion yuan, 3.962 billion yuan, 4.980 billion yuan and 3.879 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 73.41%, 70.37%, 71.96% and 72.40% of the total purchase amount respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the overseas sales accounted for 85.24%, 85.19%, 84.74% and 83.59% respectively, and the overseas purchases accounted for 95.65%, 93.38%, 87.61% and 87.93% respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the domestic income of Jiangbolong was 624 million yuan, 847 million yuan, 1.110 billion yuan and 870 million yuan respectively, accounting for 14.76%, 14.81%, 15.26% and 16.41% of the main business income respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, Jiangbolong’s overseas income was 3.604 billion yuan, 4.873 billion yuan, 6.165 billion yuan and 4.431 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 85.24%, 85.19%, 84.74% and 83.59% of the main business income respectively. 

  After long-term technology accumulation, Jiangbolong has formed 47 core technologies closely related to its business, achieved 12 achievements based on core technology research and development, and is engaged in 25 major research and development projects. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange raised questions about the company’s core technology and core competitiveness in the first round and the second round of inquiries about Jiang Bolong. These include: explaining the reasons why the number of invention patents obtained during the reporting period is significantly less than that outside the reporting period, whether most of the current patents of the issuer are obsolete and have no great commercial value, and whether the core technology of the issuer is advanced; Explain the importance of the relevant license of SD memory card to the issuer, the relevant license fee and license period, and whether it can ensure the issuer’s long-term use; Before the signing of the license agreement in June 2019, whether the issuer involved in the use of relevant licenses, whether there were disputes or potential disputes. 

  According to the prospectus, there are a number of related party transactions in Jiang Bolong, among which a related party sales amount reached 114 million yuan in 2019, which was for Jiang Bolong to sell storage products such as solid state drives to U Lucky International (HK) Co., Ltd. (Youxiang International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.). The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaobo, the brother of Cai Huabo’s eldest brother and spouse, one of Jiang Bolong’s real controllers, holds 100% shares. In addition, Jiang Bolong’s real controllers Cai Huabo, Cai Lijiang and others have provided unlimited guarantee for Hong Kong Jiang Bolong, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company. 

  The price of products sold by Jiang Bolong to related parties is much lower than the unit price of similar products. Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s second round of audit inquiry on Jiang Bolong shows that in 2019, Jiang Bolong sold 114 million yuan to related party Youxiang International (Hong Kong); In 2018-2019, it sold 20,035,100 yuan and 13,083,700 yuan to Hengchu Trade respectively, and sold 6,825,800 yuan and 24,214,400 yuan to friends and partners. In 2020, it will sell 25,855,700 yuan to CLP Port. The selling price of Jiangbolong to related parties is far lower than the selling unit price of similar products. For example, the selling unit price of Jiangbolong to Youxiang International in 2018-2019 ranged from 14.71 yuan/piece to 26.57 yuan/piece, while the average selling unit price of Jiangbolong’s solid-state drives in the same period was 108.74 yuan/piece and 143.28 yuan/piece. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange requires Jiang Bolong to explain the fairness of related party transactions, the reason why the issuer’s sales price to related parties is much lower than the unit price of similar products, whether there is a big difference between the content and model of products sold by the issuer to the related parties and the issuer’s main product sales structure, the necessity and rationality of related transactions, and whether there is any interest transfer situation. 

  In addition, Jiang Bolong’s equity transfer has also caused the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to pay attention to the inquiry, whether it obviously regulates profits and whitewashes performance. Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s first inquiry about Jiang Bolong showed that the company’s investment income from the disposal of long-term equity investment in 2020 was 107 million yuan, mainly due to the sale of a 2.61% stake in Microelectronics. In November, 2020, Jiangbo Longzi Company Tibet Yuanshi transferred 0.78% and 1.83% equity of a microelectronics company to Kaiying Venture Capital and Chuangke Town respectively. After the completion of the above-mentioned equity transfer, Jiang Bolong’s remaining shareholding ratio in a microelectronics company was 4.79%. At the same time, he no longer sent directors to a microelectronics company and did not participate in its daily operation and management activities, which was considered to have no significant impact on it. He adjusted the remaining 4.79% equity to other non-current financial assets and re-measured it at fair value. As the fair value of a microelectronics company’s equity was higher than the book value of long-term equity investment, a large amount of current investment income was recognized. According to public information, after the transfer, Jiang Bolong remains the third largest shareholder of Deyi Microelectronics. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange requires Jiang Bolong to explain the rationality of the issuer’s confirmation of the investment income of a microelectronic equity sold until 2020 in combination with the payment time and the change time of industrial and commercial registration. Whether the above-mentioned equity transfer time is close to the end of the reporting period has obvious motives for regulating profits and whitewashing performance shows whether Kaiying Venture Capital and Maker Town are related or closely related to the issuer’s actual controller, Dong Jiangao and their related parties. 

  According to the data released by China Flash Memory Market (CFM) and Omdia(IHS Markit), in 2020, the company ranked seventh in the global market share of eMMC products, third in the global market share of Lexar memory cards and fourth in the global market share of Lexar flash drives. According to public information, the market share of DDR5 is expected to rapidly surpass DDR4.  

  The Shenzhen Stock Exchange asked Jiang Bolong to briefly explain the differences in application fields, implementation functions, storage capacity and technical routes of various products of the issuer; Explain the difference between the technical level of the issuer’s main products and its main competitors, and the price difference between the issuer’s main sales price and the similar products with the same specifications of its main competitors, and analyze whether the issuer is competitive compared with its main competitors; Combined with the substitution of DDR5 for DDR4 and the latest technology development in the storage industry, this paper explains whether the issuer’s main product types and technical routes are facing the risk of being replaced or eliminated, and gives a risk warning in the prospectus. 

  Jiang Bolong said in his reply that the global semiconductor memory market is huge, and the company’s operating income is growing rapidly, but the market share is small and there is broad room for growth. 

  Jiang Bolong has a commercial secret infringement dispute litigation. According to the prospectus, the case is in the first instance stage and is currently undergoing judicial appraisal related to the facts of the case. Jiang Bolong sued the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court on the grounds that the defendants Hao Lu, Zhao Ying and Shenzhen Jingcun Technology Co., Ltd. infringed the commercial secrets of Jiang Bolong’s testing technology. On June 22, 2020, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court issued the Notice of Accepting Cases to accept the case. Defendant Hao Lu was a retired employee of Jiang Bolong and participated in the research and development of LPDDR3 testing technology. Jiang Bolong discovered that the defendant was selling products containing the above testing technology in the market at the end of 2018, so he sued the defendant to stop the infringement and jointly compensated Jiang Bolong for economic losses and punitive damages totaling 132,044,800 yuan. Jiang Bolong disclosed the draft prospectus on December 9, 2021, showing that as of the signing date of the prospectus, the case was in the first instance stage. At present, judicial expertise related to the facts of the case is being carried out. In addition, Jiang Bolong’s WeChat WeChat official account published a message on July 13, 2020. On July 7, 2020, the company suddenly received a lawyer’s letter from Jingcun Company, claiming that Jiang Bolong deliberately concealed the facts and framed others. 

  According to the prospectus, Cai Huabo, the controlling shareholder of Jiang Bolong, was involved in the case of Ji Zhen, the former deputy head of Nanshan District, Shenzhen, as a witness. According to the criminal judgment No.350 (2017) at the beginning of Guangdong 03 Criminal Sentence made by Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court on December 18th, 2017 and the Criminal Ruling No.395 (2018) at the end of Guangdong Criminal Sentence made by Guangdong Higher People’s Court on June 8th, 2018, Ji Zhen introduced Huade Company and Jiang Bolong to Cai Huabo on the grounds of supporting his student Zeng Moming to start a business. Huade Company’s business scope includes integrated circuit business and Jiangbolong Co., Ltd. has outsourcing cooperation with other manufacturers in testing business. Therefore, Jiangbolong Co., Ltd. signed an entrusted testing contract with Huade Company and paid a testing fee of 1 million yuan, but Huade Company failed to fulfill its corresponding contractual obligations, and this testing fee was actually occupied by Ji Zhen. Hou Jizhen was convicted of accepting bribes and corruption, and the case has been closed. 

  According to the refereeing document network, in the first half of 2013, Shenzhen Jiangbolong Electronics Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jiangbolong Company") applied to the Nanshan District Government for funding for science and technology projects, and with the help of the defendant Ji Zhen, it finally won the funding for science and technology projects of RMB 2 million. Since then, Ji Zhen asked Cai Mobo, the chairman of the company, that the company sign an entrusted test contract with Huade Company and pay the test fee of RMB 1 million. Cai Mobo agreed. On November 27th, 2013, Ji Zhen appointed Zeng Moming to sign a contract with Jumbolong Company on behalf of Huade Company. On January 6, 2014, Jumbolong Company transferred RMB 1 million to Huade Company. The contract was not actually performed, and it was a false contract. The so-called test fee was the benefit fee charged by Ji Zhen to Jiang Bolong Company, which was used by Ji Zhen for personal purchase. 

  According to the prospectus, Jiang Bolong distributed cash dividends of 20 million yuan and 59.3383 million yuan in April 2018 and May 2021 respectively. Regarding the above cash dividends, Shenzhen Stock Exchange asked Jiang Bolong to analyze and explain the necessity and appropriateness of the relevant large cash dividends, and whether they match with Jiang Bolong’s financial situation, focusing on analyzing and explaining the rationality of Jiang Bolong’s cash dividends in the case of losses in 2018, such as the articles of association of Jiang Bolong. Explain the use of dividend funds of Jiang Bolong’s actual controller and major shareholders. 

  Mainly engaged in the research, development, design and sales of Flash and DRAM memories. 

  Jiang Bo is mainly engaged in the research, development, design and sales of Flash and DRAM memories. The company faces the application market and consumer market of consumer electronics, industry, communication, automobile, security, monitoring and other industries, and provides customers with high-performance, high-quality and innovative memory chips and products. The company has four product lines: embedded storage, solid-state hard disk, mobile storage and memory stick. 

  The draft prospectus disclosed by Jiang Bolong on December 9, 2021 shows that as of the signing date of the prospectus, the controlling shareholder of the company is Cai Huabo, and the actual controllers are Cai Huabo and Cai Lijiang. Cai Huabo and Cai Lijiang are brothers and sisters. Together, they directly and indirectly control 246 million shares, accounting for 66.33%, of which Cai Huabo directly holds 162 million shares, accounting for 43.68%. Cai Lijiang directly holds 14.7 million shares, with a shareholding ratio of 3.96%; At the same time, Cai Huabo indirectly controlled 69.3 million shares, accounting for 18.69%, by being the executive partner of Longxi No.1, Longxi No.2, Longxi No.3, Longjian Management and Longxi No.5.. 

  Cai Huabo is the largest shareholder of Jiang Bolong, with a shareholding ratio of 43.68%; The National IC Fund is the second largest shareholder of the company, with a shareholding ratio of 6.93%; Cai Lijiang is the eighth largest shareholder of the company, with a shareholding ratio of 3.96%; Longxi No.1, Longxi No.2 and Longxi No.3 are the fourth, fifth and sixth largest shareholders of the company respectively, with shareholding ratios of 5.13%, 5.13% and 4.80% respectively; Longxi No.5 is the twelfth largest shareholder of the company, with a shareholding ratio of 1.70%. 

  According to the prospectus, Cai Huabo is a China citizen with no permanent residency abroad. He was born in 1976 and has a high school education. From 1996 to 1999, he served as a salesman of Shenzhen Haiyangwang Investment Development Co., Ltd.; Jiang Bolong Co., Ltd. was founded in 1999 and has served as general manager, executive director and chairman of Jiang Bolong Co., Ltd.; From 2015 to 2018, he served as an independent director of Beijing Junzheng Integrated Circuit Co., Ltd.; He is currently the chairman and general manager of the company. 

  Cai Lijiang, a China citizen with no permanent residency abroad, was born in 1976 and graduated from Jiangxi Hualian Institute of Foreign Trade with a junior college degree. From September 1998 to October 1999, he served as a design engineer of Shenzhen Baoan Debao Industrial Development Co., Ltd.; Since October 1999, he has worked in Jiang Bolong, and now he is the senior vice president of the company. 

  Jiang Bolong plans to be listed on the Growth Enterprise Market of Shenzhen Stock Exchange this time. The number of public offerings is not less than 10% of the total share capital of the company after the issuance, and it does not exceed 42 million shares. The sponsor and lead underwriter are CITIC Jiantou Securities Co., Ltd., and the joint lead underwriter is HSBC Qianhai Securities Co., Ltd. Jiang Bolong plans to raise 1.5 billion yuan this time. After deducting the issuance expenses, he will invest in the following projects: 

  1. The second phase construction project of Jiangbolong Zhongshan Storage Industrial Park, with a total investment of 700 million yuan, plans to invest 700 million yuan to raise funds; 2. Enterprise-level and industrial-level memory research and development projects, with a total investment of 361 million yuan, and plans to invest 350 million yuan to raise funds; 3. Replenish the working capital. The total investment of the project is 450 million yuan, and it is planned to invest 450 million yuan to raise funds. 

  In the first half of 2021, the operating income was 5.302 billion yuan, and the net profit was 680 million yuan. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiangbolong’s operating income was 4.228 billion yuan, 5.721 billion yuan, 7.276 billion yuan and 5.302 billion yuan respectively, of which the main business income was 4.228 billion yuan, 5.721 billion yuan, 7.276 billion yuan and 5.301 billion yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong received cash of 4.135 billion yuan, 5.874 billion yuan, 7.539 billion yuan and 5.338 billion yuan, respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiangbolong’s net profit was-58,436,900 yuan, 127 million yuan, 276 million yuan and 680 million yuan respectively, of which the net profit attributable to the owners of the parent company was-56,539,700 yuan, 128 million yuan, 276 million yuan and 680 million yuan respectively. 

  From January to June of 2018 to 2021, the net cash flow generated by Jiangbolong’s operating activities was-212 million yuan,-173 million yuan, 424 million yuan and-971 million yuan respectively. 

  In 2018, 2019 and January-June, 2021, the net cash flow generated by Jiangbolong’s operating activities was lower than the current net profit, mainly because with the expansion of production and operation scale, the company’s inventory scale grew rapidly, and the cash expenditure for purchasing goods and accepting labor services was relatively large; In 2020, the net cash flow generated by the company’s operating activities was higher than the current net profit, mainly because the downstream customers paid back more actively and the sales paid back well when the market was good and the storage products were in short supply. At the same time, the company adopted a more active purchasing and stocking strategy. In the fourth quarter of 2020, the inventory purchase scale was large, and the amount of accounts payable increased rapidly at the end of the credit period. 

  It is estimated that the annual operating income in 2021 will be 9.600 billion yuan to 10.140 billion yuan, and the net profit returned to the mother will be 960 million yuan to 1.035 billion yuan. 

  After review, from January to September 2021, the total assets of Jiangbolong were 6.091 billion yuan, an increase of 20.50% over the end of last year; Total liabilities were 1.751 billion yuan, up 9.98% from the end of last year. 

  From January to September 2021, Jiangbolong’s operating income was 7.679 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 67.45%; The net profit was 948 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 3997.91%; The net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company was 948 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 3997.91%; The net profit returned to the mother after deduction was 871 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 475.74%. 

  From January to September 2021, the net cash flow generated by Jiangbolong’s operating activities was-838 million yuan, compared with-2,645,900 yuan in the same period of last year, with a change ratio of-31,562.27%. 

  Jiang Bolong said in the prospectus that from January to September 2021, the net cash flow generated by the company’s operating activities was-838 million yuan, and the net outflow increased rapidly compared with the same period of last year, mainly because on the one hand, with the expansion of production and operation scale, the company’s inventory increased by 1.182 billion yuan at the end of September 2021 compared with the end of last year, and the cash expenditure for purchasing goods and accepting labor services was relatively large; On the other hand, the company’s operating income maintained steady growth, and the accounts receivable at the end of September 2021 increased by 309 million yuan compared with the end of the previous year. 

  In addition, based on the current operating conditions and market environment of Jiangbolong, the company expects its annual operating income to be 9.600 billion yuan to 10.140 billion yuan in 2021, an increase of 31.94% to 39.36% compared with 2020; The net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company is 960 million yuan to 1.035 billion yuan, an increase of 247.53% to 274.68% compared with 2020; After deducting non-recurring gains and losses, the net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent company is 883 million yuan to 958 million yuan, an increase of 186.80% to 21.116% compared with 2020. 

  Jiang Bolong’s above-mentioned 2021 annual performance forecast is only a reasonable estimate of the management’s operating performance, and it does not constitute the company’s profit forecast or performance commitment without being audited or reviewed by certified public accountants. 

  In the first half of 2021, the total assets were 5.673 billion yuan and the total liabilities were 1.603 billion yuan. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the total assets of Jiangbolong were 2.751 billion yuan, 4.033 billion yuan, 5.055 billion yuan and 5.673 billion yuan respectively, of which the current assets were 2.327 billion yuan, 3.475 billion yuan, 4.299 billion yuan and 4.723 billion yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong’s total liabilities were 706 million yuan, 924 million yuan, 1.592 billion yuan and 1.603 billion yuan respectively, of which current liabilities were 647 million yuan, 881 million yuan, 1.560 billion yuan and 1.546 billion yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the current ratio of Jiangbolong was 3.60 times, 3.95 times, 2.76 times and 3.06 times respectively, the quick ratio was 1.54 times, 1.87 times, 1.32 times and 0.86 times respectively, and the asset-liability ratio (parent company) was 5.30%, 9.19% and 0.86 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the average asset-liability ratio of comparable listed companies in the same industry was 56.77%, 54.01%, 51.65% and 54.49% respectively. Among them, Smart Global’s asset-liability ratio is 72.19%, 61.16%, 64.14% and 76.66%, Weigang’s asset-liability ratio is 66.34%, 66.89%, 65.80% and 63.09%, and the pirate ship’s asset-liability ratio is 79.94%, 79.54% and 66. 

  In the first half of 2021, the monetary fund was 603 million yuan. 

  From January to June of 2018 to 2021, Jiangbolong’s monetary funds were 531 million yuan, 1.198 billion yuan, 1.585 billion yuan and 603 million yuan respectively, accounting for 22.83%, 34.47%, 36.86% and 12.76% of current assets respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the deposits in Jiangbolong Bank were 531 million yuan, 1.198 billion yuan, 1.585 billion yuan and 603 million yuan respectively, accounting for 99.98%, 99.99%, 100.00% and 99.99% of the monetary funds respectively. 

  The balance of accounts receivable in the first half of 2021 was 611 million yuan. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the book value of Jiangbolong’s accounts receivable was 407 million yuan, 409 million yuan, 385 million yuan and 610 million yuan respectively, accounting for 17.50%, 11.77%, 8.96% and 12.93% of current assets respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the balance of accounts receivable of Jiangbolong was 408 million yuan, 410 million yuan, 386 million yuan and 611 million yuan respectively, of which the balance of accounts receivable within three months was 397 million yuan, 405 million yuan, 353 million yuan and 611 million yuan respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the amounts paid back by Jiang Bolong after the accounts receivable period were 408 million yuan, 409 million yuan, 386 million yuan and 537 million yuan, respectively, and the proportions of the paid back after the period were 99.87%, 99.90%, 100.00% and 87.88%. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the turnover rate of accounts receivable of Jiangbolong was 13.83 times, 14.02 times, 18.33 times and 21.30 times respectively, and the average of comparable companies in the same industry was 7.79 times, 7.11 times, 7.39 times and 7.59 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the accounts receivable turnover of Smart Global, a comparable company in the same industry, was 6.13 times, 5.33 times, 5.18 times and 5.61 times respectively, the accounts receivable turnover of Weigang was 9.75 times, 8.91 times, 9.66 times and 8.53 times respectively, and the accounts receivable turnover of pirate ships was 7.68 times and 6.76 times respectively. 

  The inventory balance in the first half of 2021 was 3.457 billion yuan. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the book value of Jiangbolong’s inventory was 1.333 billion yuan, 1.825 billion yuan, 2.246 billion yuan and 3.393 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 57.26%, 52.53%, 52.24% and 71.84% of current assets. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the inventory balance of Jiangbolong was 1.391 billion yuan, 1.852 billion yuan, 2.267 billion yuan and 3.457 billion yuan respectively, and the inventory depreciation reserve was 58.156 million yuan, 27.0826 million yuan, 21.3206 million yuan and 64.1743 million yuan respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that at the end of June 2021, the company’s provision for inventory depreciation increased, mainly due to the fluctuation of the market price of memory chips. From January to June 2021, the market demand for memory chips was strong, and the supply and demand of DRAM storage wafers were relatively tight. After the market price of memory chips rose rapidly in the first quarter, the price fell back in the second quarter. As a result, the company’s provision for inventory depreciation increased. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the inventory turnover rate of Jiangbolong was 3.04 times, 3.23 times, 3.15 times and 2.95 times respectively, and the average of comparable companies in the same industry was 5.21 times, 5.31 times, 5.25 times and 4.23 times respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the inventory turnover of Smart Global, a comparable company in the same industry, was 5.72 times, 5.73 times, 6.43 times and 4.97 times respectively, the inventory turnover of Weigang was 6.13 times, 5.71 times, 4.60 times and 3.50 times respectively, and the inventory turnover of pirate ships was 5.64 times, 5.82 times and 5.50 times respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that the company’s ending inventory is relatively large, and may further increase with the expansion of the company’s operating scale. Every year, the company makes corresponding provision for depreciation according to the amount that the net realizable value of the inventory is lower than the cost. Because the gross profit margin of the company’s products is relatively low and the inventory scale is relatively large, in the future, if the market supply and demand change greatly, the raw material price fluctuates greatly, the product market price and gross profit margin drop sharply, and the technical iteration leads to the decline or elimination of product demand, the company will face the risk of inventory depreciation loss, which will adversely affect the company’s financial situation and operating results. 

  In the first half of 2021, the short-term loan was 574 million yuan. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong’s short-term loans were 271 million yuan, 350 million yuan, 414 million yuan and 574 million yuan respectively, accounting for 41.82%, 39.72%, 26.57% and 37.15% of current liabilities respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that at the end of each reporting period, the amount of short-term loans of the company showed an upward trend, mainly due to the increase in capital demand with the expansion of the company’s business scale. 

  In the first half of 2021, the comprehensive gross profit rate was 21.59%, which was lower than the industry average in the first three years. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the comprehensive gross profit margin of Jiangbolong was 7.62%, 10.71%, 11.96% and 21.59% respectively, and the gross profit margin showed an overall upward trend. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the average gross profit margins of comparable companies in the same industry were 15.17%, 17.42%, 19.05% and 21.54% respectively. Among them, the gross profit margins of Smart Global are 22.62%, 19.60%, 19.28% and 18.44% respectively, while those of Weigang are 6.05%, 11.07%, 14.82% and 18.60% respectively, and those of pirate ships are 11.95%, 16.14% and 20.53 respectively. 

  According to Jiangbolong’s product categories, the gross profit margin of embedded storage is 6.41%, 14.21%, 10.84% and 24.63%, the gross profit margin of solid-state disk is 4.60%, 5.27%, 9.75% and 15.33%, and the gross profit margin of mobile storage is 10.16%, 10.34% and 18.33% respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that from 2018 to January-June 2021, the gross profit margin of the company’s main business was 7.62%, 10.71%, 11.97% and 21.59%, respectively, showing an upward trend. The changes in the gross profit margin of the company’s products were comprehensively affected by factors such as product structure, supply of upstream raw materials, fluctuation of storage market demand and changes in market competition pattern. 

  In the second half of 2021, the purchase price of storage wafers and the sales price of storage products both fell after the rapid increase in the first half of the year, while the company’s inventory turnover days were about 3-4 months. Due to the interval between purchase and sales cycles, the change of the company’s product sales cost was lagging behind, which led to the decline of the company’s gross profit margin in the fourth quarter of 2021. It is estimated that the gross profit margin in the fourth quarter will be 14%-16%, compared with 2021. 

  In the future, if the company’s product structure cannot be continuously optimized, the storage wafer supply or storage market demand fluctuates greatly, the market competition becomes increasingly fierce, and the product market price drops sharply, the company will face the risk of fluctuation or decline in gross profit margin. 

  Risk of fluctuation of gross profit margin caused by fluctuation of wafer price. 

  The main raw material of Jiangbolong products is storage wafers. From 2018 to January to June 2021, the cost of storage wafers accounted for 78.04%, 75.57%, 79.76% and 79.86% of the company’s main business cost, respectively. The market price changes of storage wafers and storage products have a great impact on the company’s gross profit margin.  

  Storage products with general specifications usually have an open market reference price, and the market price transmission mechanism is smooth. The change trend of the sales price of storage products is usually consistent with the change trend of the purchase price of storage wafers. However, because the unit price of product sales is affected by the market price at the point of sale and the unit cost is affected by the market price at the point of purchase, there is a production and sales cycle interval between them, and the change of product unit cost lags behind the change of product sales unit price, which makes the gross profit margin of memory manufacturers fluctuate with the fluctuation of wafer price. Other things being equal, in the rising stage of market price, the sales unit price rises before the unit cost, and the gross profit margin usually shows an upward trend; In the stage of market price decline, the sales unit price falls before the unit cost, and the gross profit margin usually shows a downward trend; When the market price is stable or fluctuating, the difference between the unit selling price and the unit cost is small, and the gross profit margin is usually stable. Therefore, due to the market price fluctuation of storage wafers during the reporting period, the company’s gross profit margin fluctuated due to the periodic interval between wafer procurement and product sales. 

  In this context, if the market price of storage wafers rises sharply in the future, and the price increase of raw materials fails to be effectively transmitted, the sales price of the company’s products will not rise simultaneously; Or the market price of storage wafers has fallen sharply. Because it takes a certain period of time for procurement and production, the decline in product sales price precedes the decline in cost, which will cause the company to be unable to fully absorb the impact of wafer price fluctuation, so the company has the risk of fluctuation or decline in gross profit margin, which will adversely affect the company’s operating performance and profitability. 

  The listed company Weil Co., Ltd. was the largest customer of Jiangbolong in 2018 and withdrew from the list of the top five customers in 2020. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the sales amount of Jiangbolong to the top five customers was 929 million yuan, 1.803 billion yuan, 2.510 billion yuan and 1.789 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 21.98%, 31.51%, 34.49% and 33.74% of the total sales respectively. 

  It is worth noting that in 2018, the largest customer of Jiangbolong was the listed company Weir, and the sales amount of Jiangbolong to Weir in that year was 315 million yuan. By 2019, Weir was ranked as the fourth largest customer of Jiangbolong, and the sales amount of Jiangbolong to Weir in that year was 236 million yuan. From January to June in 2020 and 2021, Weir withdrew from the list of the top five customers of Jiangbolong. 

  Suppliers are relatively concentrated 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the purchase amount of Jiangbolong from the top five suppliers was 2.861 billion yuan, 3.962 billion yuan, 4.980 billion yuan and 3.879 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 73.41%, 70.37%, 71.96% and 72.40% of the total purchase amount respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that the main raw material of the company’s products is storage wafers. Storage wafer manufacturing is a capital-intensive and technology-intensive high-barrier industry, with large capital investment, high technical threshold and obvious scale effect. These characteristics lead to a high concentration of global storage wafer supply and relatively concentrated suppliers. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the company’s purchases from the top five suppliers accounted for 73.41%, 70.37%, 71.96% and 72.40% respectively. In the future, if there is a shortage of major raw materials such as storage wafers due to unexpected events such as natural disasters and major accidents, or due to geopolitical changes, trade frictions, changes in import and export and tariff policies, and cooperation relations, the major raw materials such as storage wafers required for the company’s production may not be supplied in a timely and sufficient manner, and in extreme cases, the supply may be cut off, thus affecting the stability of the company’s production and supply, which may have a major adverse impact on the company’s production and operation. 

  Overseas sales and overseas purchases all exceed 80%. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, the overseas sales accounted for 85.24%, 85.19%, 84.74% and 83.59% respectively, and the overseas purchases accounted for 95.65%, 93.38%, 87.61% and 87.93% respectively. 

  The company said that the scale and amount of overseas sales and purchases are relatively large, accounting for a relatively high proportion. The company’s product export and raw material procurement are mainly denominated and settled in US dollars, and the exchange rate change of RMB has a certain impact on the company’s operating performance. During the reporting period, the company’s exchange earnings were 8,886,400 yuan, 280,500 yuan, 3,356,600 yuan and-2,776,600 yuan, respectively, accounting for 0.19%, 0.99% and -0.35% of the total profits of the current period in 2019, 2020 and January-June 2021, respectively. If the RMB exchange rate fluctuates greatly due to the influence of domestic and foreign economic environment in the future, the company may face certain exchange rate fluctuation risk, which will adversely affect the company’s operating performance. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, the domestic income of Jiangbolong was 624 million yuan, 847 million yuan, 1.110 billion yuan and 870 million yuan respectively, accounting for 14.76%, 14.81%, 15.26% and 16.41% of the main business income respectively. 

  From 2018 to January-June 2021, Jiangbolong’s overseas income was 3.604 billion yuan, 4.873 billion yuan, 6.165 billion yuan and 4.431 billion yuan respectively, accounting for 85.24%, 85.19%, 84.74% and 83.59% of the main business income respectively. 

  Jiang Bolong said that during the reporting period, the company’s main business income mainly came from Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and the company’s income in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan was relatively high, which was consistent with industry practice. Hong Kong has a mature business environment, developed logistics system and convenient transportation conditions, and has strong advantages in resources and supporting capabilities. It has become an important international distribution center for electronic products. Considering factors such as logistics, trading habits, taxation and foreign exchange settlement, delivery in Hong Kong has become an industry practice, and some domestic customers mainly purchase through their Hong Kong branches or supply chain companies. 

  Core technology and core competitiveness were questioned in two rounds. 

  After long-term technology accumulation, Jiangbolong has formed 47 core technologies closely related to its business, achieved 12 achievements based on core technology research and development, and is engaged in 25 major research and development projects. In addition, Jiangbolong enhances its competitiveness through continuous technological innovation. By June 30, 2021, the company had obtained 426 valid patents at home and abroad (103 overseas patents), including 165 invention patents, won the China Patent Excellence Award twice and owned 65 software copyrights. 

  Jiang Bolong suggested in the prospectus that the company has accumulated a number of core technological achievements and intellectual property rights through years of independent research and development, and established an internal control system related to core technologies. In the future, if the internal control system related to the company’s core technology is not effectively implemented, or the core technology is leaked due to gross negligence, malicious collusion and fraud, it may damage the company’s core competitiveness and adversely affect the company’s production and operation. 

  The Shenzhen Stock Exchange raised questions about the company’s core technology and core competitiveness in the first round and the second round of inquiries about Jiang Bolong. These include: 

  Combined with the substitution of DDR5 for DDR4 and the latest technology development in the storage industry, this paper explains whether the issuer’s main product types and technical routes are facing the risk of being replaced or eliminated, and gives a risk warning in the prospectus; 

  Explain the reasons why the number of invention patents obtained during the reporting period is significantly less than that outside the reporting period, whether most of the current patents of the issuer are obsolete and have no great commercial value, and whether the core technology of the issuer is advanced; 

  Explain the reasons why the number of invention patents applied for and obtained in the reporting period accounted for a small proportion of the number of invention patents issued by the issuer, and whether the issuer has strong innovation and creation attributes; 

  Explain the importance of the relevant license of SD memory card to the issuer, the relevant license fee and license period, and whether it can ensure the issuer’s long-term use; Before the signing of the license agreement in June 2019, whether the issuer involved in the use of relevant licenses, and whether there were disputes or potential disputes. 

  In 2019, related sales amounted to 114 million yuan. 

  According to the prospectus, there are a number of related party transactions in Jiang Bolong, among which a related party sales amount reached 114 million yuan in 2019, which was for Jiang Bolong to sell storage products such as solid state drives to U Lucky International (HK) Co., Ltd. (Youxiang International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.). The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaobo, the brother of the spouse of Cai Huabo, one of Jiang Bolong’s real controllers, holds 100% of the shares. 

  From January to June in 2018, 2019 and 2021, Jiang Bolong purchased the main control chips from Deyi Microelectronics and its subsidiaries for 15,569,300 yuan, 5,141,000 yuan and 21,972,500 yuan respectively. The company is a joint venture of Jumbo Longyuan, and part of its equity was transferred in November 2020; Li Zhixiong, director and deputy general manager of Jiang Bolong, once served as a director of the company, and retired in December 2020. 

  In 2018 and 2018, Jiang Bolong purchased solid-state hard disks from Shenzhen Haoyouban Technology Co., Ltd. for RMB 3,826,500 and RMB 12,163,800 respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaoling, the eldest brother and spouse of Cai Huabo, one of Jiang Bolong’s real controllers, holds 80% of the shares and serves as the general manager and executive director, and Xing Xiaobo, the younger brother of Xing Xiaoling, holds 20% of the shares. 

  From 2018 to 2020, Jiang Bolong purchased 21,000 yuan, 79,200 yuan and 174,500 yuan from Shenzhen Zhongdian Port Technology Co., Ltd. respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Cai Jing, director of Jiang Bolong, is a director. 

  In 2018, Jiang Bolong purchased SSD from Sunshine Disk Trading Limited for RMB 212,600. The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaoling, the spouse of Cai Huabo’s eldest brother, holds 100% shares. 

  In 2019 and 2020, Jiang Bolong purchased outsourcing accessories from Wuhu Jinsheng Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. for RMB 5500 and RMB 53000 respectively. The company is a company where Jiang Bolong’s director Zhu Yu once served as a director and retired in June 2018. 

  In 2018 and 2019, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as SSDs to U Lucky International (HK) Co., Ltd. (Youxiang International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.) for RMB 3,317,300 and RMB 114 million respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaobo, the brother of Cai Huabo’s eldest brother’s spouse, holds 100% of the shares. 

  In 2018 and 2019, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as mobile storage to Sunshine Disk Trading Limited for RMB 20,035,100 and RMB 13,083,700 respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaoling, the spouse of Cai Huabo’s eldest brother, holds 100% shares. 

  From 2018 to 2020, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as solid-state disks to Shenzhen Haoyouban Technology Co., Ltd. for RMB 6,825,800, RMB 24,214,400 and RMB 280,500 respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Xing Xiaoling, the eldest brother and spouse of Cai Huabo, one of Jiang Bolong’s real controllers, holds 80% of the shares and serves as the general manager and executive director, and Xing Xiaobo, the younger brother of Xing Xiaoling, holds 20% of the shares. 

  From 2018 to January-June, 2021, Jiang Bolong sold 42,200 yuan, 43,500 yuan, 25,855,700 yuan and 6,895,600 yuan of embedded storage products to Shenzhen Zhongdian Port Technology Co., Ltd. respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Cai Jing, director of Jiang Bolong, is a director. 

  From 2018 to 2020, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as solid-state disks to Shenzhen Andaxing Technology Co., Ltd. for 1,103,800 yuan, 443,200 yuan and 169,200 yuan respectively. The company was an enterprise in which Jiang Bolong and Cai Huabo held 20% and 40% shares respectively in the first 12 months of the reporting period, and withdrew in February 2017. 

  In 2018, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as wireless memory to Shenzhen Yinglai Hechuang Electronics Co., Ltd. for 1,133,800 yuan. The company is an enterprise in which Cai Huabo’s eldest brother Cai Jinjiang holds 27.43% of the shares and serves as the executive director. 

  From 2018 to 2020, Jiang Bolong sold 761,100 yuan, 12,400 yuan and 10,900 yuan of embedded storage products to Deyi Microelectronics and its subsidiaries respectively. The company is a joint venture of Jumbo Longyuan, and part of its equity was transferred in November 2020; Li Zhixiong, director and deputy general manager of Jiang Bolong, once served as a director of the company, and retired in December 2020. 

  In 2018, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as solid state drives to Wuhu Jinsheng Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. for 411,200 yuan. The company that changed the company to Jiang Bolong’s director Zhu Yu once served as a director has stepped down in June 2018. 

  In 2018 and 2019, Jiang Bolong sold storage products such as wireless memory to Shenzhen Smart Bay Technology Co., Ltd. for 33,000 yuan and 10,800 yuan respectively. The company is an enterprise in which Cai Huabo’s eldest brother Cai Jinjiang holds 51.14% of the shares and serves as the general manager and executive director. 

  Cai Huabo and Cai Lijiang, the actual controllers, have provided unlimited guarantees for wholly-owned subsidiaries. 

  According to the prospectus, Jiang Bolong’s actual controllers Cai Huabo, Cai Lijiang and others have provided unlimited guarantees for Hong Kong Jiang Bolong, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company. 

  From July 29, 2015 to June 27, 2018, Cai Huabo provided unlimited guarantee for Hong Kong Jumbolong, which has been fulfilled; From June 29, 2016 to April 13, 2018, Cai Huabo, Cai Lijiang, Li Zhixiong and Netcom Technology (HK) Limited provided unlimited guarantee for Hong Kong Jumbolong, which has been fulfilled; From May 25, 2018 to August 19, 2021, Cai Lijiang provided unlimited guarantee for Hong Kong Jumbolong, which has been fulfilled; From June 27, 2018 to August 19, 2021, Cai Huabo provided Hong Kong Jiang Bolong with a guarantee of 75 million US dollars, which has been fulfilled. In addition, since January 12, 2018, Cai Huabo has continued to guarantee Hong Kong Jumbolong, which has not been fulfilled yet. 

  In order to meet the normal capital demand under the background of the rapid development of Jiangbolong’s business, the company borrowed funds from Netcom Technology (HK) Limited and Shenzhen Jiangbolong Holdings Co., Ltd., which were controlled by the actual controllers, for temporary capital turnover. The above-mentioned capital borrowing was completed in 2018, and the interest was paid to Netcom Technology (HK) Limited with reference to the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate in the same period. The interest was not accrued for the capital borrowing from Shenzhen Jiangbolong Holdings Co., Ltd. due to its short term and small amount. Wang Jingyang and Bai Hongtao used personal funds as the company’s working capital outside the reporting period, and the above-mentioned funds were cleared in 2019. 

  Jiang Bolong has twice borrowed funds from Netcom Technology (HK) Limited, amounting to US$ 4.9 million and US$ 12 million respectively; RMB 14 million was borrowed from Shenzhen Jiangbolong Holdings Co., Ltd.. 

  Outside the reporting period, Wang Jingyang and Bai Hongtao used personal funds as the company’s working capital, amounting to 3.57 million yuan and 1.42 million yuan respectively. 

  In addition to the above matters, Jiang Bolong also has receivables and payables from related parties. 

  The associated sales price is low. Shenzhen Stock Exchange asks whether the benefits are transferred. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s second round of audit inquiry on Jiang Bolong shows that in 2019, Jiang Bolong sold 114 million yuan to related party Youxiang International (Hong Kong); In 2018-2019, it sold 20,035,100 yuan and 13,083,700 yuan to Hengchu Trade respectively, and sold 6,825,800 yuan and 24,214,400 yuan to friends and partners. In 2020, it will sell 25,855,700 yuan to CLP Port. The selling price of Jiangbolong to related parties is far lower than the selling unit price of similar products. For example, the selling unit price of Jiangbolong to Youxiang International in 2018-2019 ranged from 14.71 yuan/piece to 26.57 yuan/piece, while the average selling unit price of Jiangbolong’s solid-state drives in the same period was 108.74 yuan/piece and 143.28 yuan/piece. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange requires Jiang Bolong to explain the fairness of related party transactions, the reason why the issuer’s sales price to related parties is much lower than the unit price of similar products, whether there is a big difference between the content and model of products sold by the issuer to the related parties and the issuer’s main product sales structure, the necessity and rationality of related transactions, and whether there is any interest transfer situation.  

  Jiang Bolong said in his reply that Hong Kong Youxiang is mainly engaged in the trade of electronic products such as storage, and has certain customer resources and sales channels in the field of storage products. Through cooperation with it, the company aims to expand the market sales of storage products such as solid state drives with its customer resources and sales channels, and it is necessary and reasonable to sell products to it. 

  At the same time, in addition to selling to Hong Kong Youxiang, the company also sells the same model products to other unrelated third-party customers, accounting for about 20% of the sales to Hong Kong Youxiang, and the sales unit price is basically the same as that of unrelated third parties, so there is no interest transfer. 

  Therefore, the difference between the sales price calculated by the company from Hong Kong Youxiang and the overall sales unit price of the company’s solid-state hard disk is mainly due to the difference in storage capacity and specifications, and the price calculated based on storage capacity is relatively small; It is necessary and reasonable for the company to sell products to Hong Kong Youxiang. The sales of the same model products to Hong Kong Youxiang account for a relatively small proportion, and the sales unit price is basically the same as that of unrelated third parties, so there is no interest transfer. 

  When the time of equity transfer approached the end of the reporting period, it was asked whether it was obvious to regulate profits and whitewash performance. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s first inquiry about Jiang Bolong showed that the company’s investment income from the disposal of long-term equity investment in 2020 was 107 million yuan, mainly due to the sale of a 2.61% stake in Microelectronics. 

  In November, 2020, Jiangbo Longzi Company Tibet Yuanshi transferred 0.78% and 1.83% equity of a microelectronics company to Kaiying Venture Capital and Chuangke Town respectively. After the completion of the above-mentioned equity transfer, Jiang Bolong’s remaining shareholding ratio in a microelectronics company was 4.79%. At the same time, he no longer sent directors to a microelectronics company and did not participate in its daily operation and management activities, which was considered to have no significant impact on it. He adjusted the remaining 4.79% equity to other non-current financial assets and re-measured it at fair value. As the fair value of a microelectronics company’s equity was higher than the book value of long-term equity investment, a large amount of current investment income was recognized. According to public information, after the transfer, Jiang Bolong remains the third largest shareholder of Deyi Microelectronics. 

  Deyi Microelectronics is mainly engaged in the design, technical development and sales of master control chips, and is the upstream manufacturer of the issuer’s industrial chain. In 2018 and 2019, Jiang Bolong purchased master control chips from Deyi Microelectronics for 15.5693 million yuan and 5.1410 million yuan. 

  One of the questions asked by Shenzhen Stock Exchange to Jiang Bolong on the above issues is: combining the payment time and the change time of industrial and commercial registration, it shows that it is reasonable for the issuer to confirm the investment income of a microelectronic equity sold until 2020; whether there is obvious motivation to control profits and whitewash performance when the above equity transfer time is near the end of the reporting period, and whether Kaiying Venture Capital and Maker Town are related or closely related to the issuer’s actual controller, Dong Jiangao and their related parties. 

  Shenzhen Stock Exchange asked Jiang Bolong to explain the reasons for not appointing directors to Deyi Microelectronics in the light of the current composition of the board of directors of Deyi Microelectronics and the fact that the issuer’s shareholding ratio is higher than that of the above-mentioned shareholders who have appointed directors to Deyi Microelectronics. Whether the basis for determining that the issuer has no significant influence on Deyi Microelectronics is sufficient, whether it should be determined that it has a significant influence on Deyi Microelectronics in accordance with the principle of substance over form, and whether there are cases in which a large amount of investment income is confirmed by not appointing directors and changing the accounting of Deyi Microelectronics. 

  Jiang Bolong said in response to the two rounds of audit inquiries of Shenzhen Stock Exchange that the company’s equity transfer time was near the end of the reporting period, and it was fully considered to obtain a microelectronics equity financing arrangement, and it was determined through consultation with the counterparty that there was no motivation to regulate profits and whitewash performance, and there was no case of confirming a large amount of investment income by not sending directors or changing the accounting of Duiyimicroelectronics. 

  Small market share 

  According to the data released by China Flash Memory Market (CFM) and Omdia(IHS Markit), in 2020, the company ranked seventh in the global market share of eMMC products, third in the global market share of Lexar memory cards and fourth in the global market share of Lexar flash drives. According to public information, the market share of DDR5 is expected to rapidly surpass DDR4.  

  The Shenzhen Stock Exchange asked Jiang Bolong to briefly explain the differences in application fields, implementation functions, storage capacity and technical routes of various products of the issuer; Explain the difference between the technical level of the issuer’s main products and its main competitors, and the price difference between the issuer’s main sales price and the similar products with the same specifications of its main competitors, and analyze whether the issuer is competitive compared with its main competitors; Combined with the substitution of DDR5 for DDR4 and the latest technology development in the storage industry, this paper explains whether the issuer’s main product types and technical routes are facing the risk of being replaced or eliminated, and gives a risk warning in the prospectus. 

  Jiang Bolong said in his reply that the global semiconductor memory market is huge, and the company’s operating income is growing rapidly, but the market share is small and there is broad room for growth. 

  Memory, as an irreplaceable functional device in the fields of consumer electronics, communication equipment and Internet of Things, is now 

  One of the most widely used core components in the information industry, in the global integrated circuit market, memory cores 

  Chip has always been the product category with the largest market share of integrated circuits. According to the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Organization 

  (WSTS) data, the scale of the global integrated circuit industry in 2020 is 361.226 billion US dollars, of which memory cores 

  The chip scale is $117.482 billion, accounting for 32.52% of the total scale of the integrated circuit industry. 

  In 2018, 2019 and 2020, the company’s operating income was 4.228 billion yuan, 5.721 billion yuan and 7.276 billion yuan respectively. Based on the global semiconductor memory market size calculated by the World Semiconductor Trade Statistics Organization (WSTS), the company’s operating income accounted for only 0.40%, 0.78% and 0.90% of the global semiconductor memory market size, and its market share remained. 

  Save a commercial secret infringement dispute litigation. 

  Jiang Bolong has a commercial secret infringement dispute litigation. According to the prospectus, the case is in the first instance stage and is currently undergoing judicial appraisal related to the facts of the case. 

  Trade secret infringement dispute: Jiang Bolong sued the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court on the grounds that the defendants Hao Lu, Zhao Ying and Shenzhen Jingcun Technology Co., Ltd. infringed the trade secret of Jiang Bolong’s testing technology. On June 22, 2020, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court issued the Notice of Accepting Cases to accept the case. Defendant Hao Lu was a retired employee of Jiang Bolong and participated in the research and development of LPDDR3 testing technology. Jiang Bolong discovered that the defendant was selling products containing the above testing technology in the market at the end of 2018, so he sued the defendant to stop the infringement and jointly compensated Jiang Bolong for economic losses and punitive damages totaling 132,044,800 yuan. 

  The subject matter involved in the above case is a test algorithm protected by Jiang Bolong in the form of trade secrets, not Jiang Bolong’s patented technology. The relevant testing algorithms are mainly used for testing LPDDR3 DRAM products. When the defendant infringes, because Jiangbolong still sells LPDDR3 products, the relevant testing technology is of certain importance. With the iterative upgrade of Jiangbolong LPDDR DRAM product line, the sales revenue and proportion of LPDDR3 decreased year by year. However, because LPDDR3 is still widely used in the low-end market, the related technologies still have great economic value for storage enterprises that mainly focus on this market. 

  Jiang Bolong disclosed the draft prospectus on December 9, 2021, showing that as of the signing date of the prospectus, the case was in the first instance stage. At present, judicial expertise related to the facts of the case is being carried out. 

  In addition, Jiang Bolong’s WeChat WeChat official account published a message on July 13, 2020. On July 7, 2020, the company suddenly received a lawyer’s letter from Jingcun Company, claiming that Jiang Bolong deliberately concealed the facts and framed others. 

  Regarding the above lawyer’s letter, Jiang Bolong said that the company has sent a lawyer’s letter in time to reply, pointing out that the viewpoint of the other lawyer’s letter can’t be established at all, and reserves the right to safeguard its rights and interests by legal means. 

  In addition, Jiang Bolong still has a labor dispute. 

  On April 2, 2021, Jiang Bolong received the Notice of Respondent issued by the People’s Court of Nanshan District, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province. Ceng Sheng, a retired employee of Jiang Bolong, appealed for a judgment to order Jiang Bolong to fulfill the Supplementary Agreement of the Technology Transfer Framework Agreement, grant him 15,000 shares (tentatively 15,000 yuan) and bear the legal costs of the case. 

  On December 5, 2019, Jiang Bolong signed the Technology Transfer Framework Agreement with three natural persons, including Chengdu elegant demeanour Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Chengdu elegant demeanour") and Ceng Sheng, stipulating that Jiang Bolong would receive some technologies from Chengdu elegant demeanour; On December 6, Jiang Bolong and Ceng Sheng signed the Supplementary Agreement to the Framework Agreement on Technology Transfer, stipulating that Jiang Bolong hired Ceng Sheng and others as employees, who were entitled to join Jiang Bolong’s employee equity incentive plan; On December 11th, Shanghai Jiang Bolong and Ceng Sheng signed the Labor Contract. 

  On March 27th, 2020, Ceng Sheng and Shanghai Jiang Bolong signed the Agreement on Dissolution (Termination) of Labor Relations (hereinafter referred to as "Dissolution Agreement"), and Shanghai Jiang Bolong gave Ceng Sheng one-off compensation, and the Technology Transfer Framework Agreement, the Supplementary Agreement to the Technology Transfer Framework Agreement signed by Ceng Sheng and Jiang Bolong and the relevant equity incentives in the employment notice became invalid at the same time. On April 7th, 2020, Shanghai Jiangbolong paid all the severance compensation to Ceng Sheng in one lump sum according to the Termination Agreement. 

  On May 17th, 2021, the People’s Court of Nanshan District, Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province ruled that the case was not an ordinary civil contract dispute but a labor dispute, and dismissed the plaintiff Ceng Sheng’s lawsuit. On May 23, 2021, Ceng Sheng refused to accept the above ruling and appealed to the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court. On July 8, 2021, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court issued a Civil Ruling (2021) No.19702, which rejected the appeal and upheld the original ruling. 

  In addition, Shanghai Jiang Bolong brought a lawsuit to the Yangpu District People’s Court in Shanghai for Ceng Sheng’s violation of the Agreement on Termination, requesting Ceng Sheng to return all the severance pay. On June 29th, 2021, the People’s Court of Yangpu District, Shanghai made the Civil Judgment (2021) No.11124 at the beginning of the Republic of China, and the judgment dismissed the claim. On August 10, 2021, Shanghai Jiang Bolong appealed to the Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, and the case is still under trial. 

  Cai Huabo, the controlling shareholder, is a witness in the bribery case. 

  According to the prospectus, Cai Huabo, the controlling shareholder of Jiang Bolong, was involved in the case of Ji Zhen, the former deputy head of Nanshan District, Shenzhen, as a witness. 

  According to the criminal judgment No.350 (2017) at the beginning of Guangdong 03 Criminal Sentence made by Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court on December 18, 2017 and the Criminal Ruling No.395 (2018) at the end of Guangdong Criminal Sentence made by Guangdong Higher People’s Court on June 8, 2018, Ji Zhen supported his student Zeng Moming to start a business. Introduce to Cai Huabo that Shenzhen Huade Innovation Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Huade Company") cooperated with Jiang Bolong Co., Ltd. in SSD testing. Huade Company’s business scope includes integrated circuit business and Jiang Bolong Co., Ltd. has outsourcing cooperation in testing business with other manufacturers. Jiang Bolong Co., Ltd. signed an entrusted testing contract with Huade Company and paid the testing fee of 1 million yuan, but Huade Company failed to fulfill the corresponding contractual obligations, and this testing fee was actually occupied by Ji Zhen. Hou Jizhen was convicted of accepting bribes and corruption, and the case has been closed. 

  Except for Cai Huabo, who assisted the public prosecution in this case, neither Jiang Bolong nor Cai Huabo was put on file for investigation or prosecution by the judicial authorities, and no criminal compulsory measures were taken. According to the Letter of Work issued by Shenzhen People’s Procuratorate on March 24th, 2021, Jiang Bolong Limited and Cai Huabo were not put on file for investigation by Shenzhen People’s Procuratorate, and were not prosecuted by Shenzhen People’s Procuratorate for suspected criminal offences. According to the Certificate of No Criminal Record issued by shenzhen public on February 8, 2021, Cai Huabo was not found to have a criminal record from March 6, 1976 to February 5, 2021. 

  According to the refereeing document network, in the first half of 2013, Shenzhen Jiangbolong Electronics Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Jiangbolong Company") applied to the Nanshan District Government for funding for science and technology projects, and with the help of the defendant Ji Zhen, it finally won the funding for science and technology projects of RMB 2 million. Since then, Ji Zhen asked Cai Mobo, the chairman of the company, that the company sign an entrusted test contract with Huade Company and pay the test fee of RMB 1 million. Cai Mobo agreed. On November 27th, 2013, Ji Zhen appointed Zeng Moming to sign a contract with Jumbolong Company on behalf of Huade Company. On January 6, 2014, Jumbolong Company transferred RMB 1 million to Huade Company. The contract was not actually performed, and it was a false contract. The so-called test fee was the benefit fee charged by Ji Zhen to Jiang Bolong Company, which was used by Ji Zhen for personal purchase. 

  The testimony of the witness Zeng Moming (general manager of Huade Company) proves that one day in October 2013, Ji Zhen took Hua Mouzhi and me to visit Jiangbolong Company and introduced us to each other in the office of Cai Mobo, the head of Jiangbolong Company. A few days later, Ji Zhen asked me to go directly to Cai Mobo in the name of Huade Company, saying that there was a project cooperation between the two sides, amounting to 1 million yuan. As for the cooperation content, he did not mention it to me. After I met Cai Mobo, I asked him if he had a cooperation project of 1 million yuan. Cai Mobo said that Ji Zhen had already agreed with him, and there was no need to talk about it. Then he asked a manager surnamed Zhang from his company to come to his office to meet me specifically. I introduced the situation and left. A week later, Manager Zhang invited me to meet with Jiang Bolong Company. There were me, Manager Zhang and another manager Liu (female, in her fifties) of Jiang Bolong Company present. They put forward a contract on the spot, and the contents were not agreed, so they let me go back. Not long after, manager Zhang sent me the contract, the content of which was about testing the performance of memory. The contract was signed by manager Zhang on behalf of Jiangbolong Company. After I printed it, I signed and sealed it for Qiangmou and sent it back to Jiangbolong Company for signature and seal. At the beginning of 2014, Jumbolong Company transferred RMB 1 million to Huade Company by means of public-to-public bank transfer between companies, and Huade Company also provided corresponding invoices to Jumbolong Company. 

  The dividend for two years is nearly 80 million yuan. 

  According to the prospectus, Jiang Bolong distributed cash dividends of 20 million yuan and 59.3383 million yuan in April 2018 and May 2021 respectively. 

  On April 9, 2018, Jiang Bolong’s shareholders’ meeting reviewed and approved the profit distribution plan for 2017, and distributed a cash dividend of 20 million yuan (including tax) to all shareholders. 

  In 2019 and 2020, Jiang Bolong did not distribute dividends. 

  On May 20th, 2021, Jiangbolong shareholders’ meeting reviewed and approved the profit distribution plan for 2020, and distributed a cash dividend of 1.60 yuan (including tax) to all shareholders for every 10 shares, totaling 59.3383 million yuan (including tax). 

  Regarding the above cash dividends, Shenzhen Stock Exchange asked Jiang Bolong to analyze and explain the necessity and appropriateness of the relevant large cash dividends, and whether they match with Jiang Bolong’s financial situation, focusing on analyzing and explaining the rationality of Jiang Bolong’s cash dividends in the case of losses in 2018, such as the articles of association of Jiang Bolong. Explain the use of dividend funds of Jiang Bolong’s actual controller and major shareholders. 

Interpretation of Financial Report | Qianweiyang Chef who ran away from the "Missing Department": 80% increase in production capacity for large customers or deposits.

(Source: Qianweiyang Kitchen Guan Wei)

Interpretation of financial reports in the primary market, paying attention to the issuance process

On June 19, 2020, the CSRC disclosed in advance the application of Zhengzhou Qianweiyang Kitchen Food Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Qianweiyang Kitchen") to "queue up" for listing. Looking back on history, in 2012, Qianweiyang Kitchen was wholly-owned by Zhengzhou Missing Food Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Zhengzhou Missing Food"), a subsidiary of Synear Food Holdings Limited. Then in 2016, Qianweiyang Kitchen became independent from the missing system, focusing on expanding the catering channel market of quick-frozen noodles and rice products. As a former controller of missing food, how will Li Wei realize its development plan of "recreating 3-5 core categories exceeding 100 million yuan in existing products" with Qianweiyang Chef?

As a supplier of quick-frozen noodles and rice products of well-known chain catering brands such as KFC, Pizza Hut and Haidilao, the performance of Qianweiyang Chef in recent years is "average", but at the same time, Qianweiyang Chef is faced with problems such as lower gross profit margin than its peers, declining capacity utilization rate, and "dependence" on a single customer. In the face of the complex market environment, can Qianweiyang Chef "break through"? It’s still unknown.

one

The actual controller Li Wei holds 62.49% of the shares and "takes the helm" of 56 companies.

This listing, the sponsor of Qianwei Yangchu Cooperation is Guodu Securities Co., Ltd., the auditor is Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants, and the law firm is Beijing Jingtian Gongcheng Law Firm.

According to the prospectus, the controlling shareholder of Qianwei Yangchu is Gongqingchengji Enterprise Management Consulting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Gongqingchengji"), with a shareholding ratio of 62.49%. Li Wei directly holds 100% equity of Gongqingchengji and indirectly controls 62.49% equity of Qianweiyang Kitchen, which is the actual controller of Qianweiyang Kitchen.

It should be pointed out that Li Wei, with a bachelor’s degree, did not hold a post in Qianweiyang Kitchen. In addition to Qianwei Restaurant, Li Wei also controls 8 overseas enterprises such as for Joy Development Limited and Genki HoldingsLimited, and 47 domestic enterprises such as Zhengzhou Huanghe Daguan Co., Ltd. and Henan Hailang Real Estate Co., Ltd..

As of June 8, 2020, the signing date of the prospectus, Qianwei Yangchu has a total of 16 shareholders. Except for Gongqingcheng, the top ten shareholders are Shenzhen Qianhai New Hope Chuangfu No.1 Investment Partnership, Zhuji Shangde Hewei Investment Partnership, Gongqingcheng Kaili Investment Management Partnership, Suqian Hanbang Investment Management Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Netju Investment Co., Ltd., Wei Xiuyan, Weng Lei, Zhao Jianguang and Beijing Jianyuan Times Investment Management Center.

Looking at the situation of its director, there are 8 directors on the board of directors of Qianwei Yangchu, including 3 independent directors; There are 3 supervisors and 4 senior managers.

Jian Sun, with a bachelor’s degree, is currently the chairman of Qianwei Yangchu and the executive director of Xinxiang Qianwei Yangchu Food Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Xinxiang Qianwei"). He has served as a salesman of Henan Tianlong Industrial Co., Ltd.; Zhengzhou Miss Business Representative, Shanghai Company Manager, Hong Kong Company Manager and Deputy General Manager of Marketing Center; General manager of sales of Henan Yishengyuan Food Co., Ltd.; Deputy General Manager of Zhengzhou Central Daguan Real Estate Co., Ltd., etc.

Bai Rui, master’s degree, is currently the director and general manager of Qianwei Central Kitchen and the manager of Xinxiang Qianwei; He has served as an accountant in the Finance Department of Henan Guanlian Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd.; Accountant in charge of Henan Branch of Hisense Kelon Electric Co., Ltd.; Zhengzhou misses the manager of the settlement department, the manager of the fund management department and the assistant to the deputy general manager of the marketing center.

2

Mainly engaged in the production and sales of quick-frozen noodle rice products, accounting for over 90% of revenue.

According to the prospectus, Qianweiyang Kitchen was established on April 25, 2012, and its main business is the research and development, production and sales of quick-frozen noodle rice products for catering enterprises. According to the processing methods, quick-frozen noodle rice products can be divided into four categories: frying, baking, cooking, dishes and others. The specific products include fried dough sticks, sesame balls, egg tarts, sweet potato balls and cartoon bags.

From 2017 to 2019, the main business income of Qianwei Yang Kitchen was 592.9004 million yuan, 700.8488 million yuan and 888.6315 million yuan respectively. Among them, the total income of frying, baking and cooking products in the same period was 577,119,600 yuan, 690,869,300 yuan and 866,225,600 yuan respectively, accounting for 97.34%, 98.58% and 97.48% of the main business income in the same period, which was the main source of the main business income of Qianwei Central Kitchen.

In addition, from 2017 to 2019, the realized income of dishes and other products was 15.7808 million yuan, 9.9794 million yuan and 22.4059 million yuan respectively, accounting for 2.66%, 1.42% and 2.52% of the main business income in the same period, accounting for a relatively small proportion.

three

The upstream market is fully competitive, and the price of raw materials may fluctuate.

According to the prospectus, Qianweiyang Kitchen belongs to the quick-frozen noodle rice products industry. The upstream of the industrial chain mainly includes rice, noodles, oil, meat, vegetables, miscellaneous grains and other raw materials. The price and quality of raw materials are the two major factors that quick-frozen food enterprises are most concerned about.

It should be noted that raw material expenditure is the main operating cost of quick-frozen noodle rice products enterprises, and the development of upstream industry and the change of agricultural and sideline products prices have an important impact on the production and sales of quick-frozen noodle rice products industry; Although the upstream industries provide all bulk agricultural products (000061, stock bar) with full market competition, there is rarely a shortage of supply, but due to the complex and changeable economic situation in recent years, the prices of raw materials supplied by the upstream industries are still unstable, which has a certain degree of adverse impact on the development of the quick-frozen noodle and rice products industry.

According to the prospectus, the downstream of Qianweiyang Kitchen is online and offline sales channels and cold chain logistics industry. At present, there are two mature offline sales channels for quick-frozen noodles and rice products. One is to connect with C-end consumers through shopping malls, supermarket chains, convenience stores, etc., and the other is to distribute them to B-end customers such as restaurants, enterprises and institutions, hotels, etc. through self-management and distribution.

In addition, the market demand and development level of downstream industries determine the future development direction and scale of the quick-frozen noodle and rice products industry. At the same time, with the sustained development of the national economy and the increasing awareness of consumers on food health, the products of the quick-frozen noodle and rice products industry have been continuously improved in quality and various indicators. Therefore, the quick-frozen noodle rice products industry and the downstream industry promote each other and develop circularly.

four

The performance is "average" and the gross profit margin is lower than the average level of peers.

In recent years, the performance of Qianweiyang Chef has been "mediocre".

According to the prospectus, in 2017-2019, the operating income of Qianwei Central Kitchen was 593,317,100 yuan, 701,202,700 yuan and 889,282,900 yuan respectively, which increased by 18.18% and 26.82% respectively in 2018-2019.

In the same period, the net profit of Qianwei Yangchu was 46,559,100 yuan, 58,678,900 yuan and 74,121,300 yuan respectively, which increased by 26.03% and 26.32% respectively in 2018-2019.

(Source: Qianweiyang Kitchen Prospectus)

From 2017 to 2019, the net cash flow generated by the operating activities of Qianwei Central Kitchen was 91,522,200 yuan, 12,413,000 yuan and 86,412,700 yuan respectively.

It is worth noting that in recent years, the production and sales rate and capacity utilization rate of Qianweiyang Kitchen have shown a downward trend.

From 2017 to 2019, the sales volume of Qianwei Yang Kitchen was 54,875.48 tons, 63,550.1 tons and 76,598.86 tons respectively, and the production and sales rates were 98.14%, 98.9% and 94.98% respectively. The capacity utilization rates are 87.37%, 100.4% and 81.29% respectively.

In recent years, the gross profit margin of Qianweiyang Kitchen is lower than the average of the same industry.

In 2017-2019, the gross profit margin of Qianwei Yang Kitchen was 22.69%, 23.83% and 24.5% respectively, while in the same period, Sanquan Food (002216, shares bar), Anjing Food (603345, shares bar), Zhongyin Babi, Haixin Food (002702, shares bar) and Huifa.

In this regard, Qianweiyang Kitchen said that due to the obvious differences in sales models, downstream customers, product structure and sales scale of comparable companies in the same industry, the gross profit margin also showed certain differences.

five

The top five suppliers account for nearly 50% of purchases, which may constitute a "dependence" on a single customer.

According to the prospectus, the sales model of Qianweiyang Kitchen is mainly divided into direct sales and distribution, and the two are relatively stable. From 2017 to 2019, the sales revenue of Qianweiyang Kitchen’s distribution model accounted for 59.41%, 59.31% and 58.98% respectively; In the same period, its direct sales revenue accounted for 40.59%, 40.69% and 41.02% respectively.

From 2017 to 2019, the total sales of Qianwei Yang Kitchen to the top five direct customers were 218,028,400 yuan, 255,128,100 yuan and 320,882,300 yuan respectively, accounting for 36.75%, 36.38% and 36.08% of the total operating income in the same period respectively.

During the reporting period, that is, from 2017 to 2019, the total sales of Qianwei Yangchu to the top five distribution customers were 56,518,600 yuan, 77,401,700 yuan and 100,831,300 yuan respectively, accounting for 9.53%, 11.04% and 11.34% of the total operating income in the current period, respectively, and the proportion of revenue showed an upward trend.

It should be pointed out that from 2017 to 2019, the sales revenue of Qianwei Yangchu to the largest customer Yum! China Holdings Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Yum! China") and its related parties accounted for 29.95%, 30.2% and 30.72% of the operating income respectively.

In this regard, Qianwei Yangchu said that as a T1 supplier of Yum! China, Qianwei Yangchu has a stable cooperative relationship with Yum! China, but there is still the risk that Yum! China will reduce orders or even terminate cooperation in the future, which will lead to a decline in the operating performance of Qianwei Yangchu.

In recent years, the suppliers of Qianweiyang Kitchen are more concentrated.

From 2017 to 2019, the purchase amount of Qianwei Yang Chef from the top five suppliers was 176.229 million yuan, 199.4039 million yuan and 261.8332 million yuan respectively, accounting for 48.12%, 46.14% and 47.05% respectively in the same period.

six

The total fundraising exceeds 409 million yuan, which will increase the production capacity by 80%.

With this listing, Qianwei Yangchu plans to raise 409 million yuan, which will be used to invest in "Xinxiang Qianwei Yangchu Food Co., Ltd. Food Processing Construction Project (Phase III)" and "Headquarters Base and R&D Center Construction Project" respectively.

Among them, the "Xinxiang Qianwei Yangchu Food Co., Ltd. Food Processing and Construction Project (Phase III)" plans to use 377 million raised funds, and the planned construction period of the project is 24 months. The implementation subject is Xinxiang Qianwei, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Qianwei Yangchu. The project has a total land area of 35,288 square meters and a total construction area of 53,760 square meters, including 30,000 square meters of food processing workshops (double floors) and 23,760 square meters of three-dimensional cold storage. After the completion of the project, the production scale of quick-frozen rice products with an annual output of 80,000 tons will be formed.

It is worth noting that in 2019, the existing production capacity of Qianweiyang kitchen products was 99,200 tons, that is, the new production capacity of the above projects accounted for 80.65% of its existing production capacity.

Qianweiyang Kitchen said that after the above-mentioned projects are completed and put into production, the overall capacity utilization rate of the company will reach over 90% by then. Considering the seasonality of product sales and the gradual increase of market concentration of large-scale quick-frozen noodle rice products, the issuer’s new capacity increase will basically be digested.

On the other hand, Qianweiyang Chef also admits that the investment projects with raised funds fail to achieve benefits as scheduled, or the market situation changes unpredictably after production, or the company cannot effectively explore new markets. After capacity expansion, the company will have certain risks of unsalable products or idle capacity.

Wonderful review of the past

-END -

This article first appeared on WeChat WeChat official account: Jinzhengyan. The content of the article belongs to the author’s personal opinion and does not represent Hexun.com’s position. Investors should operate accordingly, at their own risk.

(Editor: Dong Yunlong)

How to understand the opportunities and problems of the short play market in 2024?

Wen | Deep-sounding Zuyang

Last year’s short play, which was soaring all the way, is still "YOLO" in the Spring Festival this year.

In the past Spring Festival, short plays took 800 million yuan in just eight days, accounting for one-tenth of the box office of the Spring Festival movies. When Spring Mountain School, Stealing Photos and Sora are hot searches, short plays still hold up a public opinion position: the Spring Festival explosion "I became a stepmother in the 1980s" has become the focus of hot discussion from the leading actor to the behind-the-scenes trader, and the short play "Big New Year’s Day" in Tik Tok has ignited the "divorce AA system", and the star’s appearance in short plays has once again triggered discussion.

Not only at home, but also overseas short plays during the Spring Festival are in full swing. On the first day of the new year, TopShort, a short drama platform owned by Jiashu, surpassed Netflix in the Japanese iOS bestseller list. Guohai Securities Research Report predicts that the future market space of short dramas will exceed $30 billion.

Although the Spring Festival has passed, the power of the short drama Spring Festival file continues. The short drama concept stocks in the A-share market are all red, and many stocks such as Xinyada, Guomai Culture and Huayang Lianzhong have daily limit. The platform is also constantly overweight, and short plays are becoming more standardized and refined. Recently, bilibili is experimenting with short plays with monthly subscription, and Tik Tok has increased the recommendation of small programs. Aauto Quicker will upgrade the Star Mang short plays this year, which will lower the threshold for creators and increase their income.

At first glance, short drama seems to be a rare growth industry this year, but in fact, most practitioners are cautious about it. When the industry flies through the expansion period, the logic of the tuyere changes quietly, and then it is bound to be a more bitter battle. At the end of the Spring Festival, "Deep Ring" interviewed Wang Xiaoshu, the founder of Jiashu Technology, and discussed three major issues in the short play:

What is the development space for the business model of short plays?

How will the production factors of short plays change?

The short play is still in the wild period, where is the real opportunity?

How will the business model evolve?

There is an unwritten law in the commercial market: after any new track is popular, the capital with a keen sense of smell always gives feedback first. Film and television, reading and comics have all experienced the peak period of financing. On the other hand, short drama, since its birth in July 2021, has seen the daily limit of short drama concept stocks from time to time, but we rarely see the financing behavior of short drama companies.

In Wang Xiaoshu’s view, this is a problem of "business model"-at present, short play is a relatively good and healthy business with relatively good cash flow. In other words, if it’s just a short play of small programs, there is no need for financing.

In fact, according to the different sources of development and business logic, short plays are generally divided into two categories: one is short plays with small programs, which gain users’ attention by investing in streams. After users jump into small programs, they use "plot hooks" to attract users to pay, which is more traffic-oriented in nature. The other category is the boutique short drama released by the platform account. Traditional film and television companies and MCN institutions have settled in accounts and released short dramas on the short video platform, and users can watch them for free, mainly relying on brand implantation.

From this point of view, the business model of short plays has been relatively rich as a whole, including user recharge, information flow advertising and brand implantation. At present, users’ top-up is still the mainstream income mode, and it also contributes the most. In the future, Wang Xiaoshu believes: "There is more free space. In terms of income composition, advertising and brand income will increase substantially this year, and the combined data of the two may exceed the user’s recharge."

Small programs and short plays on the line around the Spring Festival

Indeed, the growth momentum of information flow advertising and brand implantation can be seen in this year’s Spring Festival file.

Last year, "Oh, the Empress Comes to Work", "Mr. Fu’s vest can’t be hidden after the flash marriage" and "Wushuang" were blessed with three explosions, and the advertising of short drama information flow continued to climb up ten million or even over one hundred million. By the Spring Festival this year, the market is even more "rolled up". According to the new wrist report, during the Spring Festival, many platforms gave high-quality traffic and rebate support, and the traffic of Tik Tok short drama applets exceeded that of WeChat short drama applets.

The Spring Festival is the peak period of user activity, and short plays bring their own eye-catching physique, which strongly stimulates users. Advertisers who have always followed users’ attention naturally can’t sit still. During the Spring Festival, they "packaged" a number of short plays in one breath, which gave them a sense of existence.

Judging from the incoming brands, the Internet platform is still a big producer of short plays. For example, Tmall exclusively named three short plays of Aauto Quicker during the Spring Festival, I Open a Bar in Dasong, Yuanyang Duane, and Super Working Family. The short play All the Way Home starring Song Muzi has the exclusive title of JD.COM Automobile.

Short play implantation

Jiashu short play is also cooperating with some brands at present. Wang Xiaoshu told "Deep Sound" that for brand owners, compared with TVC advertising and long drama implantation, the core advantage of short drama lies in "certainty".

First, the preparation and production cycle of short plays is short. Whether shooting or communicating with brands, efficiency is the first criterion. Wang Xiaoshu said that sometimes the screenwriter takes his laptop directly to the brand side to modify, how to implant the picture and what new requirements are there. The two sides communicate in time and can finish the modification in one day and satisfy the brand owner.

Secondly, short plays have less investment and higher cost performance. Under normal circumstances, the production cost of a short play is several hundred thousand, which is similar to the price of shooting a TVC advertisement, but the return rate of a short play is much higher than that of a TVC. A short play with more than ten episodes has a rich product implantation scene, and the brand can be continuously exposed, continuously deepening the audience’s cognitive impression.

Third, short plays are data-driven. After the brand is embedded in the short play, the exposure, the number of interactions and the brand search index are all quantifiable, and the brand owner has more effect indicators to refer to, and he can be "aware" every time he puts it in.

How do various factors of production change?

The development of the above business model is inseparable from the prosperity of content.

The short drama industry has been growing all the way, and two timing nodes are particularly critical. One is that in April 2022, Tik Tok released the launch and jump of WeChat applet, which directly boosted the short play to usher in a huge wave of outbreak. The daily income scale of the short drama industry has rapidly increased from several hundred thousand a day to ten million or more, and the ceiling of growth has been punctured. The other is the influx of professional production companies and MCN institutions, which has raised the professional level of short drama production.

Looking at the Spring Festival movie list, the producers behind it are almost all traditional film and television production companies, and many short plays are adapted from popular film and television IP.

Among the 10 short plays of Spring Festival staged by Tik Tok, "Go beyond it! A Juan is a derivative of the animated film The Lion Boy, which is produced by Beijing Wonderful, a subsidiary of Baina Qiancheng. "It’s windy on my way home" is adapted from the drama "Go to a windy place", which is produced and produced by Huace Film and Television. The game in disguise is a derivative short play of the movie "Put all your eggs in one basket", which is also the first time that a bad monkey has produced a short play.

Aauto Quicker’s short play "Wake up! The master behind Lord castellan is the original team of costume light comedy Protect Our Lord castellan. Guo Xiaoting and Andrew starred in the short play "Super Working Class", and the producer behind it was the other city film industry, which once produced "The annual meeting can’t stop! "Warm" and other movies.

In the small program drama market, we saw the news of the entry and preparation of the famous director team and film production company at the end of last year. Last Friday, the first short play "Violet Robbery" produced by Wanda Pictures and Lehua Entertainment was broadcast on the small program.

After the traditional film and television industry institutions entered the market, they also forced the content production of short plays to usher in iterative upgrading.

The most intuitive change is the adjustment of the talent structure in the industry. Wang Xiaoshu said that almost all the main producers in the short drama market have migrated from long dramas. After these new and truly good talents came in, the original production pattern of the industry was squeezed-the previous head was reduced to second-rate, and those who were not good at learning were directly eliminated.

Taking screenwriter as an example, Yan Min, the founder of short drama insider, once revealed that many screenwriters of short dramas were transformed from network writers, which made many short dramas more like video versions of online texts than traditional film and television production. However, with the specialization of production, Wang Xiaoshu observed that the main screenwriter who wrote well now became the screenwriter who originally wrote long plays, and after the transformation, he was "quite active" in the short play market.

Secondly, the production cost of short plays has been significantly increased. According to Wang Xiaoshu’s memory, the cost of shooting a short program in the early years was around 100,000 to 200,000, and then it gradually doubled to 400,000 and 500,000, and most of the soaring costs were used in shooting and production.

"For a 500,000 film, it may cost 100,000 yuan to buy IP and ask for a screenwriter, and the remaining 400,000 are all shot in seven to ten days."

According to "Deep Sound", according to the production links of short plays, the actor’s expenses account for the bulk of the cost. According to insiders, most of the leading actors are quoted at 3,000 to 5,000, and the head actors have reported tens of thousands of yuan a day. Li Qingling, the head of the micro-short drama business of Gumai Jiahe, once told Shenxiang: In the past, short drama group performances were calculated by the day, but now the price of each group performance has risen to more than 1,000 yuan.

With the blessing of professional teams and the continuous influx of hot money, the corresponding result is that the short drama has moved from the past earthy video of the grass-roots team to refinement and quality.

For example, the most direct change brought about by the rising price of actors is that the face value of actors is more "able to fight". One of the reasons why "I became a stepmother in the 1980s" swept the short video platform is that the hero looks like a collection of Wallace Huo and Sean Xiao.

"Short plays are the product of visual communication. From the user’s point of view, he actually doesn’t care about your cost, but only cares about whether it looks good or not." Wang Xiaoshu said.

I became a stepmother in the 1980s.

Another major upgrade is also reflected in technology. Virtual production, which has been mentioned repeatedly in the long drama market, is now being applied to short drama production.

Produced by Chuangyi Technology (the behind-the-scenes team of Liu Yexi), "Two Lives" is the first short play with virtual production, and 60% of the content is produced by virtual production. The city street view and aerial ropeway in the story are virtual assets. Xie Duosheng, co-founder and chairman of Chuangyi Technology, revealed that the cost of the whole drama is between 5 million and 10 million.

The short play going to sea is not as simple as imagined.

Undeniably, after professional producers entered the market, the cost of driving short plays soared and content production became more difficult. At this time, overseas was regarded as a new blue ocean by many entrants. In the second half of last year, China’s short plays violently drifted to the other side of the ocean, "harvesting" overseas audiences, but also set a highlight moment.

ReelShort, who entered the game earlier, boosted the data explosion growth in June last year with The Double Life of My Billionaire Hubband. After that, the new frequency was stabilized at 2 monthly shifts, and explosions continued to be launched. In November last year, Reelshort pushed TikTok to the first place in the US iOS entertainment list. ShortTV went online in September, 2023, and started to increase rapidly. At the end of September, ShortTV was ranked in the TOP10 of Google Store Entertainment Free List, and it was located in TOP1 for five consecutive days. TopShort, an overseas short drama platform of Jiashu, mainly focuses on the Japanese market, and has produced more than a dozen works. On the first day of the new year, it ranked higher than Netflix in the Japanese iOS bestseller list.

Both TikTok and Netflix are eco-level Internet head players. TikTok is not listed, with a valuation of over 100 billion. Netflix has been deeply involved in streaming media for more than 10 years, with a market value of 260 billion US dollars. The short drama platform, which is just in its infancy, can play against the giants for a short time, which is enough to see its influence in overseas markets.

Overseas explosive short play

But in fact, we see that these growth moments are not sudden behaviors, but the results of the long-term resource accumulation and market education of the short drama platform.

The parent companies or founders behind ReelShort, ShortTV and TopShort all have rich experience in online writing. ReelShort’s parent company, Chinese Online, launched the interactive visual novel platform Chapters from 2017, covering major countries and regions around the world. Wang Xiaoshu, the founder of Jiashu Technology, came into contact with the net in 2018, and then entered the short play platform TopShort, which has produced more than ten short plays before surpassing Netflix.

In the past, the online articles went to sea, which has cultivated a large number of overseas audiences’ cognition and preferences for tyrants, sadomasochism, Xianxia and other types, and accumulated a number of audiences for short plays. At the same time, the web IP also provided a rich and market-proven source reserve, which also laid the foundation for the subsequent short play.

Despite the past experience, in Wang Xiaoshu’s view, short play going to sea is not a short-term thing that can get excessive returns. All companies that do short play going to sea are not interested in the present, but in the opportunities in the market in the next three to five years.

Specific to the practical link, the short play going to sea is not as easy as expected.

For example, at the production level, practitioners must first face the differences in user habits at home and abroad. When TopShort first entered the Japanese market, it directly copied the domestic short plays and themes into the App, but Japanese users did not pay the bill. After that, TopShort began to try local production, and found out that Japanese users liked the theme of "cheating" through trial and error. However, in the short play market in China, "cheating" is only a negative behavior of the story characters, not the main line of the story, but in the Japanese market, it needs to be thoroughly written and filmed to adapt to users’ consumption preferences.

Secondly, China’s short drama companies need to do infrastructure construction to make original short dramas overseas. There is no category of short plays overseas. Directors, screenwriters and directors need to be trained from scratch, and even the most basic translations need to be re-found. Wang Xiaoshu revealed that TopShort visited a large number of Japanese companies in the early stage of its establishment and found many partners before setting up a local team in Japan. When shooting and producing, it is normal to light up and write scripts and communicate with local creators repeatedly.

TopShort short play

In addition to production, casting is also an important part of short plays. After the interconnection between WeChat and Tik Tok in China, short plays broke out. However, it is difficult to find similar breaking nodes overseas.

There is no ecological base for Applets in overseas markets, and there is no super app like TikTok, so the traffic is relatively scattered. However, the advertising materials posted to social media platforms such as Facebook and Tiktok need to be downloaded by users, registered and logged in before they can watch them, and the intermediate link is long, which is likely to cause traffic loss.

From this point of view, it is difficult to copy the story of overnight wealth in short plays overseas. Practitioners also need to be careful before entering the game-whether the level of content creation, risk-taking ability and the preferences of overseas audiences can get used to it, and whether the logic of creating vertical-screen short plays by domestic investment will be accepted by overseas audiences.

The following is part of the dialogue between Shenxiang and Wang Xiaoshu, the founder of Jiashu Technology:

[About business model]

Deep ring: What do you think is the turning point of the sudden outbreak of the short drama industry?

Wang Xiaoshu: The biggest turning point, I think, should be in March, 2012, when Tik Tok released the launch and jump of WeChat applet. The daily income scale of the industry has roughly changed from several hundred thousand a day to 10 million or more within half a year.

Because if it is hundreds of thousands a day, it is actually a business of 100 million to 200 million a year. But when it quickly broke through the ceiling and reached 10 million, it directly became a business of billions a year. Later, from a few billion to this one hundred and twenty billion, I think it has become a natural growth relatively. Therefore, Tik Tok’s intervention and efforts led to a rapid outbreak of short plays.

Deep ring: Now many listed companies are doing short drama business, but I see that startups in the short drama industry actually have no financing behavior, unlike when everyone was reading or making cartoons.

Wang Xiaoshu: I think generally speaking, it (short play) is a relatively good and healthy business with relatively good cash flow.

Of course, there may definitely be changes in the future. For example, if you do APP or AI, its business model will change, and financing may appear one after another. If it is a business model of pure small program payment, most of the company’s cash flow should be quite positive.

Deep ring: nowadays, almost all online companies are doing short plays, and the audiences of short plays and online content are also very coincident, and the payment mode is also very similar. It is also called online PPT, and short plays eat up the online market?

Wang Xiaoshu: At present, the impact is not too great. Short plays are mainly incremental markets. Generally speaking, the number of users who consume video is far greater than the number of users who consume text. In the past, we calculated that the whole novel market may be almost 10 billion a year. Short plays have now reached 30 billion to 40 billion, and it is definitely not squeezed out by this 10 billion.

However, if consumers’ consumption time is regarded as a whole and the overall consumption time has not changed, in terms of the distribution of time, after the rise of short plays, it may be that more people have moved from fragmented ultra-short videos of 15 seconds and 20 seconds to short dramas with relatively long narratives, that is, people who casually brushed short videos in Tik Tok before began to watch short plays, which has little to do with novels.

Deep ring: Because the online text is also paid and free, and now the mode of making money by watching short plays is still paid, do you think there will be any room for it in the future?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think there is a lot of free space. I think advertising revenue and brand revenue will definitely increase substantially this year. Advertising revenue is similar to the income brought by the information flow of effect, and brand revenue includes various implants in the early stage. From the perspective of composition, it is also possible for advertising and brand revenue to reach or even exceed user recharge.

Many people think that you can only make an APP for free, but this is not the case. There are many short drama theaters and a large number of short drama accounts in Tik Tok and Aauto Quicker platforms, and the penetration rate of this model far exceeds imagination. Last year, Aauto Quicker released data that the daily life of short drama users exceeded 260 million. In fact, such a large number of users have watched short dramas for free on Aauto Quicker, which is equivalent to the bottom of the pyramid. The chassis space is very large, and there are many opportunities for mining and screening.

Deep ring: Now there are many opinions that the money of short plays has been earned by the platform. In fact, not only the short play industry, but basically every industry is saying that it is working for Tik Tok and Aauto Quicker. Do you think this kind of benefit distribution is reasonable? Is it possible to change?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think in fact, in terms of business, there will be changes. For example, many short drama companies choose to go to sea this year. In essence, this is a process of exploring a better business model, whether to sell it at home or overseas. This is the problem of business model. I think short drama is a free market. You can freely choose whether to invest or not and where to make money.

However, from the perspective of profit composition, I also think that the income of content creators in the short drama industry is relatively small. This little is relative to movies, which are all about shooting a 100-minute story video, and users pay the bill, but the proportion of making movies may encourage creators more.

Of course, we have also seen some industry changes. For example, Tik Tok and Aauto Quicker have scheduled short plays, which actually encourages content creators to produce high-quality content for the platform. Although the business model is still free, I think it is also a subsidy. How to understand it? The left hand of the platform earns advertising fees by selling free short plays, and the right hand takes out part of the advertising fees to subsidize free short plays. Then the free short plays actually constitute the user base of some paid short plays. I think this cycle is established. Of course, the specific performance depends on the strength of the platform itself.

So I think it should be fine. I think the distribution of the whole profit pattern is dynamically evolving and constantly changing.

Deep ring: I just mentioned that the income composition of short plays includes recharge income, advertising income and brand income. I want to discuss with you again. Where are the difficulties and opportunities for brand implantation of short plays now?

Wang Xiaoshu: Recently, we are also doing a brand short play of a big company. In the process of doing it, we feel that the key lies in the docking of the two sides’ consciousness. We pay more attention to recharge, so advertisers have no demand for recharge, and more hope that its short play will be exposed to a greater extent; Or the brand owner wants to participate in the top-notch performance, then the problem may be that the schedule is relatively tight. In fact, it is understandable. After all, people on both sides of the content side and the brand side do one thing together, and mutual cognitive methods need to be run-in.

Brand owners still recognize the value of short plays. For them, it costs hundreds of thousands to shoot a good commercial, and the short play with similar price is more cost-effective. There are many stories in 100 minutes, so the exposure of the brand is sustainable and the user’s impression will be more profound.

At the same time, because of the way of short play, it is very suitable for publishing from media accounts, no matter whether its own brand account is rising or the brand customized short play is quoted by other platforms, the brand side thinks this is a good deal.

Deep ring: Like short drama implantation and long drama implantation, do you feel that the demands of the brand will be different?

Wang Xiaoshu: It’s not bad. Just kidding, I think short plays have a better sense of service, because we are now cooperating with brands to brand short plays, and the cost of a short play is several hundred thousand. Many brands will pay the full amount in advance, and then we will have a high degree of cooperation, whether we are directors, actors or screenwriters.

Secondly, I think the core is still fast, and it is done quickly by itself, and everyone runs in quickly. Sometimes our screenwriter takes his laptop directly to the brand to make changes. What do you say you want to do and what are your needs? We can make changes normally, and we can finish them in one day, and then satisfy the brand.

So overall, the cycle is short, the investment is small, and the effect of the service is still visible-how much exposure does my account have, how many interactive likes and comments, and will the brand’s search index be improved? These can be quantified. Compared with long plays, short plays are more certain.

Deep ring: Is it more often to directly connect with the brand, or will it be grafted on that platform?

Wang Xiaoshu: Platform. The current advertisers are basically platforms. Because we are also exploring this business model, the biggest advantage of Internet platform companies is that they are still relatively familiar with it. From the perspective of doing business, it is faster to make a list of platforms, and the platform itself has many sub-brands. If all these sub-brands are made in one round, it may be more than a dozen, which is guaranteed in quantity and sustainable. Most consumer brands are difficult to batch.

【 About production factors 】

Deep ring: Are there any important key nodes in your process of making Jiashu?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think "starting to do" is the first. I started writing in July, 2001. I was mainly writing free novels the year before, but I really felt that the best time for free novels had passed. At that time, tomatoes had great advantages, so I was confused about finding directions. Later, I saw this opportunity to combine our own story genes and abilities with trends such as new media and short videos.

Secondly, I think the production and upgrading of the whole content began last year, and many strong people joined in, which will make my understanding of the whole short play more film-oriented. Because at the earliest time, in fact, everyone’s requirements for video were not so high. After the professionals came in, the whole thing was quickly raised, and we also spent a lot of energy to catch up with the average line of the market.

I think these two things are very impressive. One is to seize the opportunity of the starting point. The outbreak of Tik Tok helped us to break the ceiling quickly. The other is that after the short play broke out, many strong people came in, and we also improved with them.

Deep ring: After these professional companies come in, what kind of influence will they have besides raising production costs?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think the production cost is at the level of comparison results. The real difference is that after a large number of Tik Tok MCN and professional production companies that make movies and TV series entered the market, the talent structure of the industry has undergone important changes.

For example, the main screenwriter who writes well now has become the original screenwriter who writes long plays. He has transformed into a short play with small programs and is very active in the market. Including directors and actors are also a migration of long dramas. You finally see the cost increase because the short dramas are finer and better, but in terms of the process, we are more concerned about the change of talents, which has been fully done by talents of medium and long dramas. Now this situation is more and more in the industry.

Deep ring: Are those people who used to do short plays eliminated?

Wang Xiaoshu: In fact, most of them have been eliminated. Of course, there will certainly be some people who are very capable of learning and can be active in the market, but from the perspective of the whole big industry structure, the former head may now be reduced to second-rate, and emerging and really good talents will come in and form a squeeze on them.

Deep ring: It’s like a math problem. After the influx of professionals, the cost will be higher and the profit will be thinner. Does the business model of short play support this surge in cost?

Wang Xiaoshu: So far, it’s actually fine. For example, we say that there may indeed be some producers or platform companies that will suffer mass losses this year, but after the whole market pulls the content to a level because of the head, it looks like malt, just like the situation we are facing, that is, you follow or not, because if you don’t follow, your business can’t go on; At least you have a chance if you follow. If you are in the top five in the whole market, you still make money, and if you are in the top ten, you should not lose money.

Now, the content cost has basically reached a stable period, and its cost growth is slow in a short time or for a long time. In the early years, it changed from 100,000 to 200,000 to 300,000 to 400,000 and 400,000 to 500,000. This change is very strong, and it has doubled. But now you have changed from 400,000 to 500,000, and this growth has become linear, so the impact on us is not great.

Deep ring: Listen, I feel that the short drama practitioners are still in an acceptable state for the platform and professional companies to raise the competition line, right?

Wang Xiaoshu: Objectively speaking, it is actually irreversible.

For practitioners, this incident happened a bit like the early cyber-movie. It was hundreds of thousands in the early days of filming a cyber-movie, and then it may be millions or even tens of millions. Of course, I don’t think short plays are very good, because short plays take the story route, not the special effects route. It will be somewhat different, but I think it can’t be confronted at the regular level. The only way is to actively cooperate with the transformation, because many colleagues have experienced things like what we are experiencing now.

Doing fine products, cultivating high-quality talents, doing more exquisite creativity and refined operations, including brand tonality and content supervision, will all change, so I think this matter is inevitable.

Deep ring: Who is the most central role in the whole process of short play? How to form a more stable relationship between the company and these core talents?

Wang Xiaoshu: In our industry, the core is the script, and we can also tell stories.

In our job, the person in charge of the story is generally divided into two. The first one is product selection, or planning, which mainly sets the general direction and categories. The other is script implementation, which is the familiar screenwriter. These two positions are the editor-in-chief, so simply speaking, this position may be the core driving force. He is setting the direction, and he will go to the script implementation after setting the direction.

In fact, if a play is successful, I think the story accounts for 50%.

Deep ring: Now everyone in the industry is talking about quality, but in fact, users are looking for coolness when watching short plays. He wants a 70-point thing, but if you give him a 90-point quality, he will not appreciate it. So what is the promotion of short drama quality? Service road? Plot? Actor? How to grasp the degree of this boutique?

Wang Xiaoshu: Short plays are mainly aimed at mass consumers. What is our deepest understanding in this field? Many things are driven by human nature. For example, the actor’s face value, the actors we used in our early years, had a few hundred dollars a day, and there were one or two thousand days. Then the actor who is better now is at least five or six thousand a day, and even better, he may spend more than 10 thousand yuan a day. Then the so-called cost increase actually only brings about one change, that is, the face value can be played better.

People like to see beautiful things by nature, so from the user’s point of view, he actually doesn’t care about your cost, he only cares about saying that the short play I saw is good-looking. Many companies do short plays well, and to some extent, they are "rolled out". If you want to be more successful, you must meet the needs of users. The most basic needs of users are to see more beautiful people, more professional acting skills and stronger emotions. In our interpretation, these things are to use better people, so that the audience’s visual experience will be better.

Short play is a kind of visual communication, which is very intuitive. Your service is not good, your face value is not enough, and many problems are particularly obvious. Some angles are also related to its investment.

Nowadays, dozens of new dramas are put on the market every day. When you are in the stream, the paying ability and depth of the drama must be determined by the satisfaction of consumers. If consumers are satisfied, they will pay more. Paying more will make your bid high enough to get traffic. This is completely the logic of users voting with their feet.

So, for example, we both played a play today, and the actor you used was a little better than the actor I used, and everything else was just the same. From a certain point of view, your competitiveness might be stronger than mine. The pricing of short plays is more dynamic, but because your visual effect is better, that user may be willing to pay 50 yuan to watch your film, while my user is only willing to pay 45 yuan, which seems to be only 5 yuan short, but in fact it may be several times worse.

The video itself makes the good and bad exposed very obvious, and at the same time, the business model of streaming makes this gap more "Matthew effect", which is a bit strong and strong. Or, you can understand the investment flow as a lever. Your advantages and disadvantages are magnified by geometric multiples. You may be just a little at first, but the differences in various superpositions are very big in the end.

Deep ring: So do you do it yourself? Or should I outsource to those distributors?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think it is the different strategies of each company. Like a crowd, it will be more comprehensive. Like most of our startups, we will concentrate on one point. Like Kyushu, although we have almost the same time of establishment, Kyushu is basically purely self-funded and has a team of hundreds of people.

Deep ring: As you mentioned just now, the core of the short play is the script. We see that there are statistical data, and 80% of the short IP plays are online. Is this data accurate? I can see people collecting scripts every day in some short drama groups, which gives people a very contradictory feeling. What is the IP supply situation at the source of short dramas?

Wang Xiaoshu: Generally speaking, many heads and explosions are from well-known IP. The head company has its own novel reserve, a stable screenwriter team, and self-made scripts are the main ones. An IP is very classic, so it is normal to change it three times and five times. For example, Dragon King’s Order is a classic male frequency. As far as I know, it has been changed ten times. Ten short plays are called Dragon King’s Order, and the possible differences are gaiden, prequel and 123.

As for accepting scripts, I think it may still be a new company, which has no script ability and its own screenwriter team in a short time, but if he wants to make achievements, he can only buy them. I think this is a strategy of each company at different stages.

Deep ring: How much will it cost to buy IP now? What is the most expensive link in the whole process of short play?

Wang Xiaoshu: If you only count the source of the novel, the general price is tens of thousands of dollars.

If you want to look at it from the perspective of revenue, it is investment, but we generally don’t count investment as cost, which is called marketing expense, because investment will only happen in one situation, that is, your ROI has become positive. If you can’t vote, you won’t vote. If you don’t vote, you won’t lose money. Although the marketing cost is big, it is not the most difficult place. The most difficult thing is the shooting and production of the drama.

If you want to say the most expensive, it may still be the shooting and production. A 500,000 film may cost 100,000 yuan for IP and scriptwriting in the early stage, and the remaining 400,000 mainly happens in shooting. The shooting cycle of short plays is about 7 to 10 days, and the costs of cast members, costumes, scene props, etc. are all spent in 7 to 10 days after starting.

Deep ring: Short drama actors seem to be hard to be recognized by mainstream entertainment circles. Some film and television dramas explicitly say not to play short dramas when casting. What do you think of their development? This has also led to a chain of contempt. Big screenwriters don’t take short plays, and some actors from good schools in China Opera and North Film don’t shoot short plays. Short plays are the feeling of low in many people’s eyes. I wonder if you have any troubles in this regard?

Wang Xiaoshu: I can understand. First of all, it is a new thing. Objectively speaking, the short play business will last for two or three years. People don’t understand it or there are many misunderstandings, and we are very calm inside. Like the online novel industry in the early days, it has developed for more than 20 years since 2002, and then it has entered the mainstream field. The mainstreaming of short plays will also be an inevitable process.

The core of the content industry is the work to speak, whether the actors have acting skills or not, not by speaking, but the core logic is the satisfaction of consumers. Many actors were amateurs before cooperating with us. After cooperating with us, his fans may now reach hundreds of thousands or even millions, which is another way to grow.

Moreover, the fan stickiness of the head comedian is very scary. If the actor’s Tik Tok account has millions of fans, and there are dozens of fans, each with 500 people, then after a play starring him is launched, everyone in the group will comment, like and forward it. I personally think that actors in medium and long plays may spend the same money, but actors in short plays bring millions of fans, and the cost performance is still very high.

Now doing brand short plays, many brand owners will name names and say that I want someone in this industry. He is in line with my brand tonality. This is a very obvious change, and advertisers have begun to pay the bill.

I think a lot of changes are continuous. Just like making the sea now, many medium and long videos are also making the sea for many years, but the short drama has not been out for a long time. Last November, ReelShort (a short drama platform of Chinese online subsidiary) surpassed Netflix in North America, which has produced a very important influence in developed countries around the world. This has never been done before, and many inherent impressions in ideas need to be slowly told with facts and time.

[About going to sea]

Deep ring: When talking about short plays going out to sea, I feel that the maturity of short plays in overseas markets is still much worse than that in China. However, many media reports have made a lot of money by going out to sea, including that foreign users will like the themes that are popular in China. Everyone has some inherent impressions. Are these impressions consistent with the real situation?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think there is a big deviation, and many concepts may be wrong. I made my own sea, and now the company that made the sea used to be my colleague, just everyone or that group of people. Our common understanding is that going to sea is not a short-term behavior.

Because China is a unified big market, everything you do in China is ready-made. You go overseas to do short plays, overseas users are newer and more fragmented, and there are cultural obstacles. You need to do infrastructure work first. On the one hand, it is necessary to cultivate users, so that users can understand short plays and consume them. Secondly, it is necessary to cultivate creators, including screenwriters and directors. For example, when we do short plays in Japan, we have to find new translations from the basic to the most basic, and we have to help Japanese creators how to write scripts, shoot short plays and find rhythm. In any case, this is not a short-term thing that will get excessive returns. Moreover, the cost of overseas drama production is much higher than that of China. If the cost is high and infrastructure is needed, how can we make money? This is so unreasonable.

Therefore, I think it is a long-term behavior to go to sea. All companies that do short plays to go to sea are more interested in the opportunities in this market in the next three to five years.

Deep ring: It’s like you just mentioned that there is a key node in China, that is, Tik Tok has released the jump of WeChat applet and opened up the whole market. Will there be such a node abroad?

Wang Xiaoshu: I don’t think it will happen in foreign countries, because its ecology abroad is originally in the form of App, and App actually focuses on long-term benefits. There is no so-called hypermedia abroad, such as Facebook, Google and TikTok, and the traffic is very scattered, so generally speaking, it won’t change overnight. Its more strength comes from long-term continuous improvement and steady promotion. From this point of view, I don’t think it will have such a particularly exaggerated moment, or it may have. The first two explosions in ReelShort suddenly brought the market up and drove many manufacturers to the sea. Recently, some colleagues and partners have talked to me, and everyone thinks that there will be some landmark events that show that this road is feasible. The course of history cannot be changed, but more people can come in and do it together, that’s all.

Deep ring: TopShort, Jiashu’s overseas short drama platform, launched the "Star Project" at the content production level, giving a list of eight finished dramas. What is the supply of this localized production team? What are the specific methods to cultivate creators in the local market?

Wang Xiaoshu: We are all doing it by local teams in Japan. I think the most basic method is recruitment. In Japan, we have offices, long-term employees, external partners and a lot of visits to many Japanese companies.

Deep ring: Will it appear that the Japanese team will be educated for him, the market will rise, and then people will do it themselves? How can the investment we sow in advance maintain its advantages in the subsequent outbreak?

Wang Xiaoshu: First, your App has users, and user accumulation is your asset. Take Japan as an example. Whether it is the download list or the best-selling list, our Topshort is higher than Netflix, which means that your progress is faster than Netflix at this stage. This is easy to understand. If your growth rate can be maintained for a long time, then you will naturally form your own barriers at the user level and the brand level.

Second, we have a cognitive lead. Now the scale of short plays in China market is very large, which is a good soil for content creators. What kind of lens should be used for shooting, how to adjust your color and how to play your lighting? Slowly, there is an understanding of specific methods and the precipitation of details. It will take a long time for the real local creators to reach the same level of cognition as us in short plays after they have completely grown up.

I think many local talents don’t care so much about which company he must serve. In fact, it is more about which company will have better personal growth and economic returns. I think our enterprises in China still have advantages in this respect. They dare to give new people opportunities and invest in new people to learn. I believe that you have trained 10 such directors, and eventually two or three people think you are very good. This is your precipitation. In the long run, if you make a market in a country and continue to generate profits, you can still survive.

Deep ring: TopShort surpassed Netflix in Japan’s iOS. Why did it suddenly make such a breakthrough? What is the competition situation of short drama App overseas?

Wang Xiaoshu: Surpassing Netflix is a dominant result, and our process is always iterative.

Topshort is the same as ReelShort. Almost a dozen films have been filmed in Japan, and the App has been launched for a while. Our understanding of the Japanese market is improving. At the beginning, we translated dramas online and translated domestic dramas overseas. If the results are not good, then adjust, what kind of Japanese users like, what kind of aesthetics they have for actors, and constantly communicate with local creators.

To tell the truth, the taste of Japan will actually be heavier. Japanese dramas like cheating, but this is not a particularly big category in China. We are mainly fond of cheating. Cheating may be just a negative behavior of love rat, which leads to the tall image of positive people. But in Japan, cheating is the main line of a story, so we have to adapt to this change. Finding a creator is the same. In a local shooting team, it is very likely that the first one is not good, so remove it, and the second one is ok. Then we will see how to make progress and keep iterative growth.

In the process of adaptation, the most important thing is that the understanding of local users has deepened and the accumulation of local talents has become thicker.

Deep ring: Sora released everyone’s discussion, saying that the video generated by AI was the first to subvert the short drama industry. I don’t want to ask Sora’s influence on short dramas, but I want to say whether we use AI in the actual operation process now. Is it happening if it is really practical? Or is it too far away?

Wang Xiaoshu: I think it is quite far away. Sora is really revolutionary, but my point of view is also very clear. It helps 90% ordinary people, but not 10% professional creators.

For example, my son will go to school to give a presentation the next day, which is very difficult for him, so Sora can definitely help most ordinary people. For another example, you are an ordinary user and want to show the decoration designer the decoration style you want. After you have mastered this tool, you can send a video to the designer, and people will know how you want to feel.

But for us, a professional creator of 10%, what we pursue is the optimization of content quality, not the reduction of cost. Because the cost reduction is meaningless in some ways, just like when we shoot a film, there are tens of millions of top-ups in China. At this time, cost is not our most consideration. What we consider is how to make high-quality content.

Therefore, the main value of Sora is to reduce the cost of video production extremely, so he must help ordinary people. Ordinary people can’t make videos or it’s very difficult to do them, so AI is very helpful to him. For professional creators, a thing has a cool effect. If you tell others that it is made by robots, everyone will feel amazing, but if you tell them that you need to pay to see it, I don’t think most people will watch it.

To put it bluntly, it’s all driven by commercialization in the end. Professional content producers are faced with the consumer market where the public pays. A 100-minute short play costs an average of 500,000 yuan, which is a great cost advantage compared with tens of millions of movies. If there is a technology that can make the cost of short plays change from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands of dollars, but the effect may be much worse than hundreds of thousands, then I think the payment logic will not stand.

Haier Group’s after-sales service process [detailed explanation]

  Introduction: As we all know, Haier Group is an old brand for many years and has always established a good reputation. No matter the quality or sales volume, Haier’s products have always been far ahead in the electrical appliance business. Of course, Haier Group’s after-sales service is also quite excellent, which is also a puzzled place for other enterprises. The following small series will introduce the process of Haier Group’s after-sales service.

  Haier group after-sales service process

  Step 1: Accept the customer’s door-to-door service. When receiving the customer’s notification of the door-to-door service task, you should first check the user information to ensure its accuracy, including home address, customer’s name, contact information, date and model of purchase, product failure status and so on. If the contact information is wrong, the home address is not clear, and the product model is not purchased, the information officer should first investigate and verify it again. If the information officer cannot verify the accurate information, he can contact the customer for verification.

  Step 2: Analyze according to the information provided by users. According to the information provided by users, analyze the possibility of failure and the spare parts needed for necessary maintenance. The repairman should judge whether the fault can be repaired, whether it should be repaired in the user’s home or in the company. At the same time, the repairman should arrange the time reasonably according to his own situation. If he fails to arrive within the agreed time with the customer, he should apologize to the customer and explain the reason for being late. (How many companies can do it, such a service attitude. )

  Step 3: Contact the user. After the repairman finds the maintenance method, he will contact the user in time and confirm the on-site maintenance time according to the customer and his own time.

  Step 4: On-site service. At the appointed time, the maintenance engineer should prepare all kinds of tools and accessories for maintenance as needed, and try to arrive about 10 minutes in advance at the appointed time. Then knock on the door, say hello to the customer before entering the door, and then show your employment certificate.

  Step 5: Start maintenance. Maintainers should listen to users’ opinions patiently in order to meet users’ requirements. Then the repairman should quickly diagnose the cause of the fault and show the relevant charging standards.

  Step 6: The maintenance is completed. After the repair, the repairman should ask whether the user is satisfied with the repair and give the company a small gift.

  Step 7: The user pays a return visit. After the door-to-door service of the repairman, there will be a customer service call to the user for communication and return visit, asking if he has received quality service. If the user is not satisfied, the service will continue to be tracked until the user is satisfied.

  How many years does Haier refrigerator guarantee?

  1. The whole machine is guaranteed for free for 1 year;

  2. The main parts (including compressor, evaporator, condenser, solenoid valve, main control board, box, door, temperature controller, filter, capillary tube, fan motor, defrosting heater, ice maker assembly and timer) are guaranteed for 3 years free of charge;

  3, the following circumstances, do not belong to the scope of free service, but can be implemented for repair, lifelong service:

  [a] Cannot produce warranty certificate and invoice ‘

  [b] Alteration of invoices;

  [c] Damage caused by unexpected factors and improper use;

  [d] Repair the damage caused by ourselves without our company’s permission;

  [e] After the expiration of the three-guarantee period, it can still be used after being repaired;

  4. The validity period of the three guarantees is calculated from the date of invoicing, deducting the time occupied by repair and no spare parts to be repaired; Within the validity period of the Three Guarantees, the consumer shall repair, return or exchange the goods with the invoice and the Three Guarantees certificate;

  5. If the product fails in performance within 7 days from the date of sale, consumers can choose to return, exchange or repair it;

  6. If the product fails in performance within 15 days from the date of sale, consumers can choose to exchange or repair it;

  7. "Performance failure" means that the product does not meet the safety and hygiene requirements, and there is unreasonable danger that endangers personal and property safety; Or does not have the use performance that the product should have; Or does not meet the express quality conditions.

  How many years does Haier inverter air conditioner guarantee?

  Machines purchased before December 30, 2007 are guaranteed for 3 years for the whole machine and 6 years for the compressor.

  The air conditioner purchased from December 31, 2007 to November 30, 2009 shall be guaranteed for 6 years, including the compressor and parts.

  From December 1st, 2009, the domestic air conditioners purchased in Jinan, Qingdao, Jining, Yantai, Wuhan, Hefei and Chongqing are guaranteed for 10 years, including compressors and parts.

  Haier household fluorine-free air conditioner purchased from January 1st, 2010 is guaranteed for 10 years, including compressor and parts.

  Summary: The above is the Haier after-sales problem introduced by Xiaobian. It is simple to say, but I believe everyone knows how hard it is to do it. Other companies also know, but they just can’t do the after-sales service like Haier Group. I hope that Xiaobian’s article can help everyone.

Forward to understand! There is a high incidence of influenza, and all your concerns are here →

CCTV News:Recently, influenza is in a seasonal epidemic period. Then, what is the current and future epidemic situation of respiratory infectious diseases in China? What should I do if I get respiratory infectious diseases? In view of the public concern about the hot issues of respiratory disease prevention and treatment, let’s understand them one by one.

According to the influenza surveillance data released by the China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, at present, more than 99% of the influenza detected in the northern and southern provinces are H1N1. Then, let’s first take a look at the current highest incidence of swine flu.

Question: What is H1N1?

Influenza viruses are divided into four types: A, B, C and D. Influenza A, which appears most frequently recently, is highly contagious and easily spreads among people, resulting in a cluster epidemic. Influenza virus is easy to mutate and cause a wide range of epidemic. Although influenza A and common cold are both respiratory infectious diseases, their symptoms are quite different.

The typical symptom of swine flu is sudden high fever. Generally, the body temperature can reach 39-mdash on the second or third day after symptoms appear. 40℃, accompanied by chills, obvious headache, muscle and joint pain, fatigue, loss of appetite and other systemic symptoms, but also cough, sore throat, stuffy nose, runny nose and other respiratory symptoms. For children, the symptoms may be different from those of adults.

Five types of high-risk groups are easy to develop into severe cases.

Experts say that H1N1 is a self-limiting disease, and most people can heal themselves in about 7 days, but it is easy to cause complications for some people, such as bacterial pneumonia, necrotizing encephalopathy and myocarditis.

According to the influenza diagnosis and treatment plan issued by the National Health and Wellness Commission, five types of high-risk groups are very easy to develop into severe cases, so we should attach great importance to it and detect and treat it as soon as possible. These five groups of people include:

Children under 5 years old (children under 2 years old are more likely to have serious complications);

Age ≥ 65-year-old people;

Accompanied by the following diseases or conditions: chronic respiratory diseases, cardiovascular diseases (except hypertension), nephropathy, liver diseases, blood system diseases, nervous system and neuromuscular diseases, metabolic and endocrine system diseases, malignant tumors, immunosuppression, etc.

Obese (BMI greater than 30);

Pregnant and perinatal women.

How to use the medicine when the flu is "recruited"?

According to experts, once symptoms such as upper respiratory tract infection and fever appear, you should grasp the gold for 48 hours, check yourself in time or go to the hospital for treatment. With the increasing number of people infected with influenza, how to take anti-influenza drugs oseltamivir and mabaloxavir has also attracted much attention.

Li Dong, chief physician of Beijing You ‘an Hospital, once said that the advantage of mabaloxavir is that it only needs to be used once, while oseltamivir needs to be taken twice a day for five days. In addition, mabaloxavir is approved by the state for people aged 5 and over. Because its effectiveness and safety have been verified for many years, oseltamivir can be used for children over 1 year old, even under special circumstances, if doctors think that the risk of influenza is high, they can also use oseltamivir.

No matter what choice you make, the doctor suggests that both of them are prescription drugs and must be used under the guidance of a doctor or pharmacist. Many people regard oseltamivir as a "specific drug" against influenza A and B viruses, but some people are worried that if oseltamivir is eaten too much, it will lead to drug resistance.

Question: Will oseltamivir be resistant?

Director Li Dongzeng said that no obvious drug resistance has been detected at present, but it is still necessary to emphasize rational drug use and not to stop drug blindly and prematurely. Because some people may feel that their symptoms have eased after using it for a day or two, they stop taking the medicine. If they stop taking the medicine too early, the virus in their bodies may not be removed, and drug resistance will easily occur at this time, so it must be enough for routine use for 5 days.

Why should children use antitussive drugs with caution?

Cough is a common manifestation of respiratory tract infection. The National Health and Wellness Committee introduced at a recent press conference that children should use antitussive drugs with caution, and many people have some doubts about this. Why should children use antitussive drugs with caution?

Xu Baoping, chief physician of Beijing Children’s Hospital affiliated to Capital Medical University, said that cough is actually a normal physiological reflex, and its main purpose is to help expel sputum and pathogenic microorganisms secreted in the airway. However, antitussive drugs inhibit cough, which is not conducive to the discharge of sputum. However, careful use does not mean that it must not be used. If the child has a particularly severe dry cough, it can be used for a short time. As the course of the disease progresses, he may soon become coughing with phlegm. At this time, it is necessary to change the medicine in time and replace the antitussive drugs with expectorants.

Experts say that if children have the flu, using antitussive drugs may cover up some symptoms and even induce some other diseases. Even if you choose to use antitussive drugs, try to choose non-dependent drugs and take them according to your doctor’s advice.

Can you take a bath after suffering from swine flu?

Recently, the topic of "A woman with H1N1 flu can’t move her hands and feet after taking a bath for 4 days" rushed to the online hot search, which triggered netizens’ attention and heated discussion. So can you take a bath after suffering from swine flu?

Zhou Qingtao, deputy director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine of Peking University Third Hospital and director of the Department of Critical Care Medicine, said that generally speaking, if the fever of H1N1 has gone down or the condition has improved, you can take a bath, pay attention to the appropriate water temperature, dry your body in time after bathing, and pay attention to keeping warm so as not to aggravate the condition. Bathing is not recommended for those patients who are suffering from fever or serious illness, which may lead to aggravation and even danger.

Details of the case of Wang Yong, former chairman of Yinchuan CPPCC: training the "little brother" who sells kebabs.

On November 22nd, China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Newspaper published the details of the case of Wang Yong, former Party Secretary and Chairman of Yinchuan CPPCC in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.

Wang Yong, male, born in November 1966, used to be secretary of Yinchuan Municipal Committee of the Communist Youth League, director of Yinchuan Tourism Bureau, deputy secretary-general of the municipal government, director of the general office of the municipal government, deputy director of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People’s Congress, deputy secretary of the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People’s Congress, deputy mayor of the municipal government, standing Committee member and secretary-general of the Municipal Committee, and secretary and chairman of the Party Group of the CPPCC. In April 2022, the official announcement was investigated.

Since he was promoted to a leading cadre at the department level in 2000, Wang Yong has served as the "top leader" of more than 10 municipal departments. He should have rewarded the organization for training and doing his job well, but he began to get used to being served. "Go out with a car, take the door with water to drink. Every day, some people make tea early, clean up, and put the documents to be processed neatly on the table, and then there is an endless stream of people asking for instructions and reporting. In the evening, it is a variety of dinner parties and decent scenery. It has lived into a regular mechanical numbness. " Wang Yong wrote in his confession.

According to the report, after entering the leadership position, Wang Yong regarded the hunting of unscrupulous businessmen as "human relations", and he thought it was necessary to find his own "trustworthy friends". According to the investigators, the vast majority of bribers involved in the case are Wang Yong’s "fellow villagers", "friends" and "colleagues". He spread out as a "fellow villager circle", built a "circle of friends" around him that he thought was safe and reliable, trained a group of "younger brothers" and used his power to undertake projects for them, thus blending interests.

Wang Yong and Su have known each other for 26 years. This "friendship" began with friendship and ended with benefits. Previously, Su had originally set up a stall to sell kebabs downstairs in Wang Yong. After working overtime, Wang Yong often went to his stall to eat supper, and he became familiar with it in the long run. In 2012, Su Mou found Wang Yong, then secretary-general of Yinchuan Municipal Government, for her daughter’s enrollment, and gave her some "benefits". Wang Yong thought Su Mou was honest, so she agreed to help and accepted the "benefits" from her. Since then, the relationship between them has changed. Wang Yong took a fancy to its "reliability" and simple social relations, so he cultivated it as a "little brother".

Since then, Su Mou relied on Wang Yong’s "care" and his business has been flourishing. Su also "reciprocated", and Wang Yong’s new house was to be renovated. He immediately paid 300,000 yuan for the renovation; Wang Yong’s wife was going abroad, and he lost no time in sending 5,000 dollars. From cleaning in Wang Yong’s home to buying mops and repairing faucets, Su made every effort to "do a good job", and his "long-term investment" in Wang Yong also allowed him to quickly accumulate tens of millions of net worth.

After seeing Wang Yong as the deputy mayor in charge of water conservancy work, Su proposed "I want to do some water works", and Wang Yong readily agreed, feeling that he should "return the favor". Through the operation of Wang Yong, Su won the bid for a water project. After winning the bid, he immediately sent 800,000 yuan in cash to Wang Yong, and Wang Yong readily "accepted it". Then, Su won the bid for the second and third projects in succession, and once again offered 200,000 yuan and 500,000 yuan. According to statistics, Su used "making money equally" as bait to bind Wang Yong’s interests and feelings, and gave Wang Yong nearly 2 million yuan in property for many times.

In April 2022, Wang Yong was examined and investigated by the Supervision Committee of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on suspicion of serious violation of discipline and law, and was taken lien measures.

After investigation, Wang Yong has received more than 700,000 yuan in gifts and 10,000,000 yuan in bribes, including 9,900,000 yuan in bribes from 16 units and individuals for 39 times after the 18th CPC National Congress.

In September 2022, Wang Yong was expelled from the party and expelled from public office; The suspected crime was transferred to the procuratorate for review and prosecution according to law. In December 2022, Wang Yong was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months in prison and fined 800,000 yuan for accepting bribes.

Wang Yong, who was once proud of the horseshoe disease and had rich resumes as the "top leader" of more than 10 departments, failed to keep his original heart and cherish the training and exercise of the organization, and completely embarked on the road of no return in the pursuit of pleasure and crazy wealth collection.

Source: Chang ‘an Street Governor WeChat (ID: Capital News) and China Discipline Inspection and Supervision News WeChat (ID: zgjjjcb)

Original title: "The details of the case of Wang Yong, the former chairman of Yinchuan CPPCC: training the" little brother "who sells kebabs"

Read the original text

Counting Economy: Stabilizing the Basic Foreign Trade and Ensuring the Smooth Operation of the Industrial Chain Supply Chain

  CCTV News:At present, the COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading around the world, which has an impact on the world economy. China’s measures to stabilize foreign trade and foreign investment are not only conducive to the healthy development of China’s economy, but also to the prosperity and stability of the world economy. When it comes to the economy, we continue to see changes in the figures.

  Data 1: an increase of 1.4%.According to the latest data from the General Administration of Customs, from January to May this year, the total value of China’s foreign trade import and export was 11.54 trillion yuan. Among them, exports in May reached 1.46 trillion yuan, up by 1.4%, continuing the positive growth trend of last month. Experts said that this is mainly because the epidemic prevention and control in China has been further consolidated, and foreign trade enterprises have taken the lead in resuming work and production in adversity, meeting the global product demand and forming a strong support for exports.

  Data 2: Over 90%.Foreign trade exports continue to grow, and imports are also actively expanding. Today (7th), there are still 150 days before the opening of the 3rd China International Import Expo, and preparations are being stepped up. Up to now, the contracted exhibition area of China International Import Expo(CIIE) Enterprise Business Exhibition has exceeded 90% of the planned area. Some exhibition areas have become saturated, and even "one is hard to find".

  Data 3: an increase of 3.9%.While the foreign trade data improved, domestic trade continued to improve steadily. According to the latest data of National Railway Group Co., Ltd., in May, the national railway freight volume was 299 million tons, up 3.9% year-on-year, and the average daily freight volume increased by 8.5% month-on-month, maintaining a high operation and sustained growth.

  Data 4: The wheat harvest is nearly 60%. According to the latest agricultural dispatch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the wheat harvest in China’s main producing areas has been accelerated at 10 million mu per day for 10 consecutive days, and the progress of wheat harvest has been nearly 60%, covering an area of more than 190 million mu. Due to timely pest control and field management, the quality of wheat this year is generally better than normal.

China is the largest fruit province, which has been underestimated for too long.

China is the largest fruit province, which has been underestimated for a long time. The original old artist’s nine lines are included in the topic # 55 contents of Scenery.

When it comes to the topic of fruit freedom, it seems that northerners are not as high-pitched as southerners. They envy the freedom of litchi in Guangdong and the large number of civilians in Guangxi, and durian and cherries are far apart.

Once someone in the circle of friends basks in the big and sweet kiwifruit, they envy at the bottom and say, "You southerners are so happy and tearful!" It is embarrassing to turn to the origin of kiwifruit. Unexpectedly, Shaanxi talents are the bosses who sit facing south and have the last laugh.

△ Shaanxi kiwifruit, hidden at a good price. /Weibo screenshot

Many people don’t know that Shaanxi, a hidden fruit province in the north, is definitely going to take the lead. In most people’s minds, Shaanxi may be blurred by carbohydrate and the Loess Plateau. In fact, it is "the largest fruit province in China"-although the fruit output is not equal to that of Shandong, according to the data released by Shaanxi Provincial Bureau of Statistics, the total orchard area in Shaanxi Province is as high as 17,317,200 mu, ranking first in the country.

Looking at the resume of Shaanxi fruit, these figures are amazing: the planting area and output of apples and kiwifruit in Shaanxi ranks first in the world, the cherry area ranks second in the country and the grape ranks third in the country. One out of every seven apples and five kiwifruits in the world comes from Shaanxi.

No wonder Shaanxi people don’t care about the freedom of cherries of southerners. They have already returned home with sweet and cheap apples and kiwis. When many people cry for a five-dollar kiwi fruit in New Zealand, Shaanxi people smile without saying a word. You know, they only sell for four or five dollars a catty.

△ Sitting at the top of the national fruit freedom contempt chain, Shaanxi people must have a seat.

China is the first fruit province, why is it?

When it comes to Shaanxi, the impression of the Loess Plateau in my mind is really profound, which is 108,000 miles away from the imagination of the first fruit province.

If you spread out the map and look at Shaanxi carefully, you won’t cause such misunderstanding. Shaanxi is located in the middle of Chinese mainland, and China’s "geodetic origin" is located in Jingyang, Shaanxi.

If Guangxi, a major fruit province, is included horizontally, then Shaanxi is absolutely vertical. Shaanxi has a long and narrow terrain, which is short from east to west and long from north to south, just spanning eight latitudes, including wet, semi-humid, arid and semi-arid areas, and three temperature zones, such as middle temperate zone, warm temperate zone and subtropical zone.

△ The long and narrow Shaanxi is all-encompassing. /google map

Usually, for the convenience of memory, we will say that Shaanxi is like "three provinces". Beishan and Qinling divide Shaanxi into three geographical plates with great differences-the northern Shaanxi is the loess plateau that everyone remembers the most, the Guanzhong in the middle is the plains thousands of miles away, and the southern Shaanxi is a warm and rainy mountain.

In Shaanxi, the scenery and folk customs between the north and the south are very different. From north to south, you can see the unique landforms of China-you can see the boundless yellow sand and mud, the towering Qinling Mountains, and the endless grasslands and paddy fields with white walls and black tiles …

△ There is also a "small Jiangnan" style in southern Shaanxi. /vision china

The complex climate, rich soil, sufficient light and precipitation give fruits unique nutrients.

Seen from north to south, the Loess Plateau in northern Shaanxi seems to be full of valleys and valleys, and the soil is loose, so it is difficult to grow crops and grains. However, the temperature-loving and cold-resistant apples are adapted to such an environment-high altitude, sufficient sunlight, thick soil layer, neutral and alkaline, and the temperature difference between day and night is large, pests and diseases are not suitable for reproduction, and the fruit has high sugar storage and stronger flavor.

△ Shaanxi mountain apples are too tempting. /tuchong creativity

Shaanxi is definitely a proper apple province. "Red Fuji is rooted in the loess slope" has been sung into the lyrics of "Xintianyou" in northern Shaanxi. Astronaut Tang Hongbo ate Shaanxi apples at the China Space Station.

The Loess Plateau is the only region in the world that meets the seven meteorological indicators of the best apple breeding area. By the end of 2020, the total apple planting area in Shaanxi reached 9,302,700 mu and the output reached 11,852,100 tons.

△ Shaanxi apples have become the fruits of astronauts.

If northern Shaanxi is Guoguo Hong, kiwifruit must have dyed the Guanzhong area green.

Guanzhong is surrounded by the most developed Weihe River system in the northwest. Zhouzhi in Xi ‘an and Meixian in Baoji are under the main peak of Qinling Mountains. They belong to temperate continental monsoon climate, with fertile soil, high organic matter content, sufficient sunshine time and superior ecological conditions, which make the kiwi fruit juice water grown here sweet and rich, soft and dense, and the taste is sometimes described as a mixture of strawberries, bananas and pineapples.

△ Zhouzhi and Meixian are the hometown of kiwifruit. /tuchong creativity

Of course, in such a superior Guanzhong plain, its fruit types also occupy the C position in Shaanxi-almost every county in Xi’ an has a fruit signboard to play.

Take Lintong as an example. Pomegranate and fire crystal persimmon here are the most irreplaceable fruit categories, and they have always been the tribute of the emperor.

△ Lintong Pomegranate and fire crystal persimmon are representatives of Shaanxi scenery.

The peaches in Weinan, Xianyang, Baoji and other places in Guanzhong area are also a must. According to the color of the pulp, they are divided into three types: yellow, white and red. The meat is tender and sweet as honey.

Hutai No.8 grape in Huxian county looks like colored glass at first sight, and it is like agate when it is clustered. It is described by local people as "it will be sweet to the same place after eating".

△ Guanzhong Peach and Hutai No.8 are so sweet that people are spinning around.

To the mountainous area in southern Shaanxi, it must be the yellow of tangerine. Located in the south of Qinling Mountains and adjacent to Sichuan Basin, Hanzhong Chenggu is blessed with the moist Han River, high terrain in the north and low terrain in the south, deep soil layer and mild climate. The citrus grown here is delicate and sweet.

Further to Ankang in the east, there are white river papaya, which is called "Qiandao Lake in Shaanxi Province". There is a vast expanse of smoke and plenty of water to nourish the surrounding area. The fresh and sweet loquat here does not lose the warmth of southern fruits.

△ Oranges born in Huainan are oranges, and the mountainous areas in southern Shaanxi are suitable for planting tangerines. /tuchong creativity

How do we eat in Shaanxi fruit stalls all year round?

Others travel to Shaanxi on the surface of carbon water, but the old artist thinks that it may be an excellent route to travel to Shaanxi according to the fruits of the four seasons.

If Guangxi is a fruit basket, Shaanxi must be a long and narrow fruit stall, which covers a wide variety from north to south, and we can find the fruits we want all year round.

In spring, the strawberries in Chang ‘an are just mouth watering in February. In April, on the north slope of Bailuyuan, cherry blossoms are everywhere. After Qingming, the trees are covered with bright red cherries. Those who have eaten Shaanxi cherries can really understand why Shaanxi people don’t care about the freedom of cherries.

△ The cherries in Bailuyuan make people forget cherries. /tuchong creativity

Summer is the season to eat melons. Watermelon in Dali is famous for its pulp, sweet taste, plenty of water and rich nutrition. It is an artifact for people in Xi ‘an to relieve summer heat.

Yanliang, Xi ‘an is not only a flight base, but also the melons here are as famous as it, soft and juicy, with fine meat and crystal clear. The "continuous melon" mentioned in the Book of Songs refers to it.

△ Yanliang Melon must have a name.

Near autumn, no one in Shaanxi can refuse the "purple pearl" grapes in Huxian County.

According to legend, Zhang Jian went to the Western Regions in the Han Dynasty to "take Putao (grapes) from Dawan and plant them next to the Palace Museum". This was the first recorded grape introduction event in history, and Shaanxi and Gansu became the distribution center of China grapes, scattered all over Shaanxi. Linwei District of Weinan has a modern grape industrial park covering an area of 200,000 mu, which is called "the hometown of grapes in China".

Chang ‘an during the Silk Road period is undoubtedly the highlight moment of Shaanxi fruit in history. Pomegranate also settled in Lintong. Lintong Pomegranate, the ancestor of China pomegranate, has a large skin, rich seeds and juicy juice, and bright colors like rubies. Bai Juyi’s poem praised it well: "The blood cells in the sunshine will drip to the ground, and the wind will turn the flame to burn people."

Fire crystal persimmon was a leader among persimmons before he went out of The Longest Day In Chang’an. His skin was thin, seedless, fine, soft, waxy, delicious and sweet. It became the latest standard to suck fire crystal persimmon while eating mutton in a basin in Xi ‘an. You can suck "a nest of honey" by inserting a straw.

And if you want to taste sweet persimmon, Fuping persimmon in Weinan is indispensable. It is recognized as the most suitable variety for making persimmon. When it is hung and dried naturally, when it is covered with icing, you can eat soft and flexible persimmon.

△ Fu Ping persimmon is sweet to the heart. /tuchong creativity

At the junction of autumn and winter, Dali winter jujube came.

The skin is thin and crisp, the flesh is sweet and crisp, and you can hear the crunchy sound when you bite it. Dali winter jujube also had a wide range of output as early as the Western Han Dynasty, and it was also presented to the court in the name of local tribute, and it was a special tribute to the royal family during the Kangxi period.

△ Dali winter jujube is refreshing, crisp and sweet.

Yanliang and Pucheng crisp pears are also categories that can’t be missed. They are called "mineral water growing on trees". The fruit is big and small, fresh and juicy. Besides fresh food, it can also be processed into pear wine, pear paste and canned food.

Shaanxi is more than just the fruit varieties mentioned above. When it comes to nuts such as red dates, walnuts and chestnuts, Shaanxi people are as straight as their backs.

Except for subtropical and tropical fruits, there are basically fruits in the north and south areas in Shaanxi. According to incomplete statistics, there are nearly 52 varieties of fruits in Shaanxi, large and small, and they are not the same all year round. Isn’t this a realistic version of "fruit liankan"?

△ Shaanxi people can play the real version of the fruit.

We Shaanxi people were raised by fruits.

Perhaps the most frequently heard news is the unsalable fruit in Shaanxi. The fruits in Shaanxi are indeed unsalable year after year, and farmers often fall into "the trouble of harvest"-"the vineyard farmers in Liquan are worried that the grapes are ripe, but no merchants are interested." "Xianyang has a bumper harvest of 10,000 mu of watermelon, but it has dropped to about 3 cents a catty, and no one has come to buy it. The melon farmers are dying."

△ In this "era of looking at faces", the slow sales of fruits in Shaanxi are distressing. /Weibo screenshot

After going to college in Shaanxi, you will understand the welfare of "giving away fruits for nothing".

Recently, there was a news screen. Shaanxi Normal University distributed more than 5,000 watermelons free of charge to more than 18,000 students in the dormitory. Pomegranate trees and persimmon trees are planted on campus, and the fruits that teachers and students often eat are persimmons, loquats, pomegranates and so on.

Nowadays, even the most common apples cost seven or eight dollars to eat in some places. Fruit freedom seems to be getting rarer and rarer. Some people have probably converted it. Shaanxi, a big fruit province, produces about 25 kilograms of fruit for everyone in the country in one year.

The fiery pomegranate flower has become the city flower of Xi ‘an. Walking on the streets of Xi ‘an, you can meet a pomegranate tree in a few steps. The fruit stall sign on the street reads "Lintong pomegranate is one yuan, pomegranate juice is ten yuan and three bottles". To outsiders, this price is like Shaanxi people eating fruit, as if it doesn’t cost anything.

△ Shaanxi people eat fruit, as if they really don’t spend any money./Weibo screenshot

Of course, the fruit freedom of Shaanxi people is not born effortlessly.

Just like the 10,000-mu apple orchard growing on the Loess Plateau, it relies on the hands of Chinese people. According to statistics, nearly 10 million mu of apples in Shaanxi can increase the forest coverage rate of the whole province by 3 percentage points, and the Loess Plateau is getting greener and greener, and the credit of fruit farmers is definitely indispensable.

△ The expansion of Shaanxi fruit industry belt has also made Shaanxi green.

One-sixth of the arable land in Shaanxi is orchards, and many towns and villages get rich by growing fruits.

During the harvest season, 75% of the winter jujube in Dali, the first county in China, will be bought out by merchants all at once, and fruit farmers can receive more than 20,000 yuan per mu on average. At present, there are 83,000 jujube farmers engaged in the winter jujube industry in Dali, with an increase of 60,000 yuan per household and an output value of about 5 billion yuan.

The planting area of kiwifruit in the province is 920,000 mu, and the output is 1.16 million tons, ranking first in the country. According to statistics, in 2020, the per capita disposable income of farmers in Meixian County reached 14,895 yuan, of which 80% came from the kiwifruit industry.

△ Getting rid of poverty and getting rich by fruit, Shaanxi people can really.

Nowadays, the apples in Shaanxi are not limited to the original 36 north latitude line north of Weihe River, but have "expanded northward and entered westward" for one or two hundred kilometers each, and came to the west of Baoji and the north of Yan ‘an.

The planting of winter jujube also expanded 400 kilometers north to Yulin, and kiwifruit "expanded eastward and moved southward". Now Weinan, Xi ‘an, Xianyang, Baoji in the northern foot of Qinling Mountain, and even southern Shaanxi in the southern foot of Qinling Mountain are vigorously planting kiwifruit.

It can be said that the fruits of Shaanxi people are free, and four points are doomed, and six points rely on hard work. They really created an enviable fruit landscape with their hands.

△ Shaanxi’s fruit area has expanded, and fruit farmers have made great contributions.

Shaanxi, which is not economically obvious, has diverse customs and humanities. People in northern Shaanxi are considered to be generous, simple and honest, people in Guanzhong are informal, people in southern Shaanxi are inclusive, and Zhong Ling is graceful.

Shaanxi fruits present a rich territory due to their diverse styles, but they always have the same characteristics-the fruits here are as low-key as Shaanxi people, without exquisite packaging and grandstanding marketing.

However, it is superior to a large quantity of delicious food, and the price is friendly to the people. It silently supports the fruit basket of 1.4 billion Chinese, and when everyone cries that there is no fruit freedom, it quietly surprises everyone.

△ Shaanxi people rely on fruit freedom to quietly surprise everyone. /tuchong creativity

References:

Neglected Shaanxi Fruit Life Travel Network

Didn’t expect that, did you China is the largest fruit province, but Shaanxi? Authentic scenery

Who is the first fruit province in China? Produce 25 Jin of fruit for every Chinese every year.

Shaanxi Apple Niu Jinpeng Going to the World

This article is the original content of the signing account [Nine Lines] of Netease News Netease New Humanity Wave Plan, and it is forbidden to reprint it at will without the authorization of the account.

Do you like Shaanxi fruit?

Zhou Zhiruo

Edit | Zhou Zhiruo

Typesetting | Xie Wuji

Proofreading | Wu Yuyan

The pictures in this article are from the Internet.

Original title: "China’s largest fruit province has been underestimated for too long"

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Can "durian is expensive" get the first place in hot search and get cheap durian?

  The price of durian 20 days ago has nearly doubled now.

  Zhou Xialin

  Durian is on the hot search again, or because of the price. On May 25th, the topic of # durian expensive # rushed to the top of the hot search in Weibo! Just a few words, but powerful, break the hearts of a group of "durian price-sensitive users."

  Just about two weeks ago, the reporter also reported that the price of durian dropped to 20 yuan a catty, and durian should be free. How come the market price has doubled in a blink of an eye?

  What caused the price of durian to soar? Can I still eat cheap durian? Will durian milk tea, cake and pizza become more expensive?

  With questions, the reporter visited supermarkets and fruit shops again.

  Wholesale markets are out of stock and prices are rising, which is the same all over the country.

  Opening the box horse fresh App, the reporter found that the golden pillow durian originally placed in position C was out of stock, and the situation of other e-commerce platforms was similar. Only Maoshanwang frozen durian or dried durian was sold.

  In hungry, Meituan and other take-away apps, the price of a 4-5 kg durian with a shell is above that of 200 yuan. Just over 20 days ago, the price of durian was as low as a catty in 20 yuan.

  There is no stock online. What about the fruit shop offline?

  In a fruit shop on Changbang South Road in Hangzhou, a group of customers surrounded the durian stall. "Boss, how much is this durian?" Is it a golden pillow durian? "

  "30 yuan is a pound, this is the durian with a big core. The durian with a golden pillow is long gone, and the wholesale market is out of stock." Lao Lou, the owner of the fruit shop, told the reporter that all the golden pillow durians on the market are out of stock now, and the store sells large-core durian, which is what everyone calls "miscellaneous durian".

  During the interview, the reporter found that a few fruit shops still sell durians with golden pillows, but the prices are all above 40 yuan/kg. The price of a durian is two or three hundred yuan, which makes many people flinch.

  The price of durian is the same all over the country. Not only in the last week or two, the price of durian in the national market has been rising since a large number of durians were listed in the middle and late April this year. According to media reports, the retail price of Thai golden pillow durian in Chengdu was below 33 yuan/kg two weeks ago, but now it is approaching 50 yuan/kg.

  Now the purchase depends on grabbing the next batch of durian from Thailand to be listed in June.

  "The more fire, the more expensive it is, the more expensive it is." This is the current durian.

  "The durian in my store will be sold out every day, and I will order it in advance the next day." Boss Wu, a fruit shop in Hangzhou Agricultural Development City Kitchen, said that this year’s durian market was particularly hot, and fruit vendors felt it. "In May, the supply was sufficient and the price was low. We were afraid to buy in large quantities, and later the price came up. Durian is still very popular. Now we have to grab it to go to the fruit market."

  Is durian really so hot? Lao Yang, a friend of the reporter, was puzzled. "Durian is delicious, but if you eat too much, you will get tired and get angry. If you eat it every day at such a high price, what kind of family will it be?"

  Why is durian on fire, and has it been increasing in price? Some netizens once again blamed the price increase on Simba, the anchor of online celebrity. "Simba has beaten the price of durian in one hand, but now?"

  Laolou has been engaged in fruit business for many years. He thinks this is a normal market law. Every year, there is such a wave of market. When durian is first listed, the price will be reduced in large quantities. When the output goes down, the price will come up.

  Boss Wu thinks it has something to do with the epidemic. In the past three years, due to the epidemic situation, few fruits were imported into the domestic market. This year, the market recovered, and a large number of durians were imported into China. At first, the price was low, which brought fire to the durian market. Coupled with the price war of e-commerce platform, the heating of the anchor with goods, "a few fires" came down, and the heat of durian remained high.

  Laolou told reporters that in addition to the delicious taste of durian itself, its derivatives are also very popular. Durian milk tea and cakes are all selling well and are very popular among young people.

  In April this year, Gu Ming launched a durian latte. The staff of Gu Ming said that the sales of durian products have been good, and the three products sold in the store — — Durian raw coconut latte, thick mango durian and thick coconut durian are all limited products, and the price will maintain the original price during the limited sales period. Durian used in ancient tea is directly imported from Thailand. At present, the price increase of durian in China has little impact on product sales.

  So, is there any chance that the price of durian will come down? Laolou said: "When the second batch of durians comes in Thailand in June, the price should drop a little, but not too much."

Analyst: Musk’s visit to China is the key landing moment of Tesla watershed-FSD.

Elon musk, CEO of Tesla, made a surprise visit to China on April 28th, which may be related to Tesla’s upcoming launch of fully automatic driving (FSD) system in China. Wall Street analysts believe that Musk’s visit to China is an important node for Tesla. On the same day, he also met with Li Qiang, Prime Minister of the State Council, China, and expressed Tesla’s desire to deepen cooperation with China and achieve more win-win results.

Faced with the slowdown of electric vehicle sales due to economic uncertainty, Tesla is counting on the high profit potential of FSD software suite. FSD has completed the beta testing phase and is currently being promoted in the United States in a regulated form. Musk revealed earlier in the first quarter earnings conference call that he planned to promote FSD to the global market after obtaining regulatory permission from various countries, with special reference to the China market.

Local enterprises in China, such as Tucki and Huawei, are actively focusing on their advanced driver assistance systems, and Tesla’s introduction of FSD in China will increase its competitive advantage. Wedbush analyst Daniel Ives regards Musk’s behavior as a key step in the landing of Tesla FSD in China, calling it a "turning point". He believes that Tesla’s long-term value lies in FSD and automation technology, and the launch of FSD in China market is a key component of this strategy.

Ives stressed that although Tesla is facing a demand test in the China market, FSD is regarded as the key to the company’s long-term growth. He maintains Tesla’s "outperform" rating and a target price of $275, while the current share price is about $168.29 per share.

In addition, Musk was scheduled to visit India last week to discuss Tesla’s local development plan, which was eventually cancelled due to "busy company affairs".